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I. INTRODUCTION: IDENTIFYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEmMA
More than a century ago, American jurisprudence began recogniz-
ing the sociological concept of privacy as a legal right.' As privacy law
developed, real-life scenarios revealed that many fundamental theories
of privacy directly clashed with theories underlying the modern inter-
pretation of the First Amendment, such as the freedom of the press.2
1. A law review article was one of the most important incitements to the conversion of
privacy as a social value into privacy as a legal right. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890); William L. Prosser, Privacy [A Legal
Analysis], in PlmosopmcAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 104, 104-05 (Ferdinand D.
Schoeman ed., 1984) [hereinafter Prosser, Privacy].
Currently, the law recognizes two distinct forms of privacy. One form is considered constitu-
tional privacy, even though the Constitution "does not explicitly mention any right of privacy."
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). This form of privacy protects an individual's freedom to
make choices regarding personal, intimate aspects of life such as education or pregnancy. See id.
at 152-53. The second form of privacy stems from state law and protects individuals from un-
wanted, unreasonable publicity. See e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape
Victims' Names, 61 FORDHAm L. REV. 1113, 1115-16 n.20 (1993) (explaining that "nearly every
state recognizes, through common law or statute, some kind of right that individuals have to
control the public use of personal information about them"); Prosser, Privacy, supra, at 106-07
(listing states whose courts recognized privacy as a legal right as of 1960).
At least one commentator has argued that the type of privacy that theoretically protects citi-
zens against media disclosures can also be traced to the First Amendment itself. See James R.
Beattie, Jr., Note, Privacy in the First Amendment: Private Facts and the Zone of Deliberation,
44 VAND. L. Rav. 899, 901 (1991). Even if it cannot be traced to the First Amendment, this form
of privacy is at least recognized by the Constitution of the State of Florida. See FLA. CONST. art
I, § 23 (guaranteeing "[e]very natural person . . . the right to be let alone").
2. See generally Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 109-13; Denis McQuail, The Mass Me-
dia and Privacy, in PRIVACY 177, 180-82 (John B. Young ed., 1978).
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The conflict between press freedoms and individuals' privacy rights
has not yet been settled satisfactorily. Both values are cherished and
"plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our soci-
ety. "3 Few people would deny that "[p]rivacy has always played a
central role in the affairs of mankind and probably always will," 4 but
neither would many deny that "the news media [cannot] survive if
they are not vigorous advocates of openness and citizen participa-
tion."'
Each of the competing values has a well-rooted legal pedigree. The
Federal Constitution refers in plain language to press freedoms.6 Indi-
viduals' rights to be free from unwanted, unreasonable publicity are
protected by the tort of public disclosure of private facts, a tort which
is "one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century."
7
The different origins of these two rights may be partly responsible for
the complex nature of the rivalry between them. The tension between
privacy rights and press freedoms is unlikely ever to be solved with a
broad principle; the United States Supreme Court adamantly, and
perhaps wisely, declines to decide whether- either doctrine is strong
enough to prevail over the other! One of the most troublesome em-
bodiments of this legal tension is the question of whether to disclose
the names of rape victims. In this context more than any other, pri-
vacy claims "most directly confront" media claims.9
3. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
4. Clemens P. Work, Whose Privacy?, 55 MONT. L. REv. 209, 234 (1994); id. at 210 (sum-
marizing results of several polls that indicated the importance of privacy to Americans); Mc-
Quail, supra note 2, at 178-79 (noting survey results that indicated privacy was important to 83%
of the population). The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that "the century has expe-
rienced a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy." Cox Broadcasting, 420
U.S. at 488.
5. Work, supra note 4, at 234. However, some surveys have indicated that a majority of
the population would sooner protect privacy than protect the press. McQuail, supra note 2, at
178.
6. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of ... the press." U.S.
CoNsr. amend. I. This prohibition also applies to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
7. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 550 (1989) (White, J., dissenting); see also Cox
Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 488 (noting continued widespread state recognition of privacy as a
legal right); Denno, supra note 1, at 1115-16 n.20.
8. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 491 (refusing to decide "whether the State may
ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press"); Florida
Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (limiting the holding to exclude an interpretation that "truthful publication
is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within
which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press"). The Court explains its
reluctance by stating: "the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving
anticipatorily." Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532.
9. See Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 489 (adding that "[t]he face-off is apparent").
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Florida Legislature
answered the victim-identity question in favor of privacy by
criminalizing the publication of rape victims' names.' 0 That law" has
remained in the Florida Statutes and was most recently codified at
section 794.03.1" However, the propriety of Florida's resolution did
not come under close judicial scrutiny until seventy-one years after its
enactment. In 1989, the United States Supreme Court in Florida Star
v. B.J.F.1 held unconstitutional the imposition of civil liability under
section 794.03 for the publication of a rape victim's name discovered
in a publicly released police report. 14 However, the Florida Star Court
did not go so far as to strike down section 794.03 as unconstitu-
tional. 11
Conversely, the Florida Supreme Court was recently willing to do
so. In December, 1994, the court issued its opinion in State v. Globe
Communications Corp. (Globe II1).16 Therein, the court examined sec-
tion 794.03 and held the statute facially invalid under the constitutions
of both Florida and the United States.17 The Florida Supreme Court
adopted much of its analysis from the Florida Star opinion."8 Al-
though the Florida Supreme Court struck down section 794.03, it rec-
ognized a possibility that the Legislature could draft a constitutional
law to achieve the same intended effect. 9
The Florida Legislature responded to the Globe Communications
decision. By the end of the subsequent session in May, 1995, the Leg-
islature had passed a new law addressing the underlying objectives of
section 794.03 30 The Legislature designed the law, the Crime Victims
Protection Act, 21 to meet the stated concerns of all four of the courts
that had previously addressed the constitutional infirmity of the Act's
10. See 1911, Fla. Laws ch. 6226, § 1, 195, 195-96 held unconstitutional by State v. Globe
Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994); infra part III.
11. 1911, Fla. Laws ch. 6226, § 1, 195,195.
12. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1995). At the time of publication, the Florida Legislature had not
yet officially removed section 794.03 from the statute books.
13. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
14. Id. at 526; see infra part IV.
15. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (reiterating that the opinion was limited to an analysis
of section 794.03 on the discrete facts of that case).
16. 648 So. 2d 110, 114 (Fla. 1994). Justice Kogan authored the court's opinion. Justices
Shaw, Harding, Wells, and Chief Justice Grimes concurred separately without comment. Justice
Overton concurred in result only, also without comment.
17. See Globe II1, 648 So. 2d at 114; see also discussion infra part V.C.
18. SeeGlobelII,648So.2dat 112.
19. See id. at 114.
20. See Crime Victims Protection Act, 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-207; infra part VI. The au-
thor wishes to thank Mr. L. Martin Reeder of Steel Hector & Davis, West Palm Beach, for
bringing the new statute to his attention.
21. See 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-207.
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predecessor. Unfortunately, the Legislature acted hastily, and the new
Act seems to parrot judicial musings rather than offer a solid, practi-
cal solution to the constitutional dilemma.
This Comment attempts to organize the relevant issues surrounding
Florida's new privacy statute for sexual assault victims. Of course, the
scope of sexual assault goes far beyond legal concerns and encom-
passes many important social and emotional issues. Shielding victims
of rape and other sexual crimes from public exposure is a laudable
goal. For several reasons, rape victims need, and probably even de-
serve, protection from the widespread publicity that the media can
create, and from the subsequent trauma that such exposure can
bring. 22 However, the four courts that reviewed Florida's original vic-
tim privacy statute reached their respective decisions on the merits of
each case without depending heavily on rape-related policy argu-
ments.23 This Comment will also focus mainly on the legal aspects of
privacy and press, but, in part II, it will preface that analysis with a
cursory overview of some important sociological concerns related to
victims and the press. The intent of part II is to recognize those argu-
ments rather than to analyze, approve, or disapprove them.
Part III reviews Florida's original legislative answer to the identity-
disclosure debate and identifies victim privacy statutes from other ju-
risdictions. Part IV outlines the United States Supreme Court's warn-
ings about the constitutionality of Florida's original victim-privacy
statute. It then focuses on the climate in Florida that caused section
794.03 to resurface and eventually to fail constitutional muster in the
state supreme court. Part V summarizes the facts surrounding the
publication of the name of William Kennedy Smith's alleged victim;
these facts formed the basis for the Globe Communications decisions.
Subsections of part V analyze the Florida court opinions in Globe
Communications that unanimously held section 794.03 unconstitu-
tional. Finally, part VI describes and critiques the replacement statute
passed by the Florida Legislature six months after the Globe decision.
This Comment concludes that Florida's new Crime Victims Protec-
tion Act is no more constitutional than the original statute. However,
the Comment does not purport to argue against all forms of privacy
for sexual crime victims. Rather, it recognizes that the United States
Constitution never allows a laudable "end" to justify unlawful
22. See discussion infra part II.
23. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); State v. Globe Communications Corp.,
622 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) [hereinafter Globe IA (quoting State of Florida v. Globe
Communications Corp., No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991) [herein-
after Globe 1]), aff'd, 648 So. 2d I10 (Fla. 1994); Globe II, 622 So. 2d at 1066; State v. Globe
Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994) [hereinafter Globe 111].
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"means. " 24 Regardless of the noble purpose of Florida's new statu-
tory scheme, the legislation is not the "highly accurate rifle"25 that it
must be in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.
II. A CURSORY OVERVIEW OF EXTRALEGAL PERSPECTIVES ADVOCATED
BY VICTIMS AND THE PRESS
A. Policy Arguments in Favor of Privacy
"The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment
carry with them something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise
the protected rights responsibly-a duty widely acknowledged but not
always observed by editors and publishers." 26
The primary and most persuasive social argument offered by those
who seek anonymity for rape victims is that rape is inherently more
traumatic and stigmatizing than other assaults .27 The type of physical
contact and intrusion involved in rape, and the unique emotions re-
lated to that form of contact, make rape an atypically atrocious
crime. Rape is unusual also because of the blame-or at least suspi-
cion-that is too often placed on the victims.? One rape counselor has
stated:
Rape is different from other crimes and should be treated
differently. Face it, [rape] isn't the same as having your wallet
stolen. If you're the victim of a theft or mugging, no one will look at
you cross-eyed and blame you, ask you what you were doing in that
part of town, or why you were wearing tight clothes, or what you did
to deserve it.29
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that rape is
"highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total
contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female
24. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (ex-
plaining that regardless of a law's efficiency, convenience, or usefulness, the law may not be
upheld "if it is contrary to the Constitution").
25. Globe II, 622 So. 2d at 1079.
26. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 1, at 1113 (speculating why most news organizations do
not publish the names of rape victims).
28. See Linda Fairstein, Panel Discussion: The Privacy Rights of Rape Victims, 61 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 1137, 1138 (1993) (describing rape as "the only crime that is generally viewed as
victim-precipitated, occurring because the victim in some way allowed the crime to occur").
"Rape victims have always been stigmatized for their behavior, and for their participation or
victimization in this type of crime." id.
29. Shann Nix, Debate Over Naming Rape Victims, S.F. Cs-aoN., Apr. 18, 1991, at Al
(quoting K. Kaufman, a counselor with San Francisco Women Against Rape).
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victim .... Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self'." 30
Our society continues to recognize these characteristics that differenti-
ate rape, and therefore many areas of the law deal with rape as a spe-
cial situation. 1 The theory espoused by privacy advocates is that
because rape is uniquely traumatic, First Amendment jurisprudence
should yield to this extremely narrow exception and deal with rape as
a special situation, just as some other areas of law have done. 2
Even in today's relatively enlightened society, rape victims continue
to be stigmatized and ridiculed.33 If victims' names are publicized, the
chances of such embarrassment are only enhanced. In conjunction,
victims' anxiety worsens with the fear of further stigmatization.3 4 Pri-
vacy advocates cite evidence which shows that public disclosure of a
victim's identity often serves only to enhance the stigma and stereo-
typing that accompany rape.3" Some commentators propose that the
press should not be allowed to exacerbate irresponsibly the potential
30. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (citation omitted). In related Coker dicta,
the Court recognized that rape is "a violent crime," which inflicts mental and psychological
damage and "undermines the community's sense of security." Id. at 597-98.
31. See Fairstein, supra note 28, at 1138 (stating that "rape and other sexual assaults were
treated differently from any other category of crime within the criminal justice system"). Linda
Fairstein's statement had a different meaning from the one implied here because she was criticiz-
ing the heavy burden of corroboration that rape victims once held. See id. But her statement is
just as true regarding current laws that are now more protective of rape victims and tougher on
rapists. See, e.g., CHARLEs W. ERRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 404.7 (1994) (pointing out that
in sexual battery prosecutions "section 794.022 of the Florida Statutes protects a sexual battery
victim's privacy from unwarranted public intrusion by establishing guidelines restricting the ad-
missibility of evidence relating to the character of the victim"); see also FLA. STAT. § 794.011(7)
(1995) (excluding rapists from receiving "basic gain-time" that would shorten their prison
terms); FLA. STAT. § 794.01 l(2)(a) (1995) (classifying sexual battery as a capital crime; i.e., pun-
ishable by death, when the rapist is an adult and the victim is a child).
32. See Nix, supra note 29, at Al; cf. Letters to the Editor: The Ultimate Dehumanizing
Crime, WAu ST. J., May 16, 1991, at A17 [hereinafter Letters to the Editor] (final letter, pro-
claiming "damn the ... psuedojournalists in the media who use the banners of civil rights and
First Amendment privileges to justify the continued humiliation of rape victims through the
publication of their names").
33. See generally, e.g., SusAN EsTiscH, REAL RAPE 3 (1987); Penelope J. Tomlinson, Pri-
vacy and Law Enforcement, in PgrVAcY 137, 144 (John B. Young ed., 1978); Gail Fitzer, Debate
Rages over Media Decision To Name Alleged Rape Victim, REuTmR NEwswrRa, Apr. 18, 1991
(quoting Rosemary Dempsey of the National Organization for Women as saying "the nature of
the crime of rape is unfortunately such that society still tends to blame the victim"); Fitzer,
supra (quoting Susan Estrich as saying "[tlo editors who say the stigma is gone, I have a list of
women whose lives say you are wrong"); Joanne Kenen, Kennedy Case Renews Debate over
Identifying Rape Victims, REUTER NEwswIR, Apr. 17, 1991 (citing theories of Harvard Law
School Professor Alan Dershowitz that implicitly acknowledge social tendencies toward stigmati-
zation).
34. See Denno, supra note 1, at 1124.
35. See Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims' Identities,
64 9. CAL. L. REV. 1020, 1032-33 (1991).
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stigma and thereby cause "significant and very real harms" to victims
who have already suffered greatly from the rape act itself.3 6
Privacy supporters highlight the fact that there is apparently a wide
base of popular public support for the concepts underlying legislation
that prohibits disclosure of rape victims' names. Various studies have
revealed that a large majority of people in the United States favor
victim privacy.37 Those interviewed affirmatively prioritize privacy in-
terests more highly than press freedoms. 8
Similar studies indicate that rape victims allege they would be far
more willing and likely to come forward, report the crime, and assist
the authorities as necessary, if statutorily enforced anonymity were
available or dependable.3 9 Stated differently, "[n]aming rape victims
would lead to a sharp decline in the reporting of rape crimes. ' 40 In
1992, the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated that only one in
ten victims reported rape. 41 Such a low ratio is rather persuasive when
arguing that society should recognize rape as a narrow area in which
First Amendment standards should be relaxed.
Theoretically, the relaxation need not be drastic. The type and
amount of information protected under typical privacy statutes for
sexual assault victims is specific and limited.42 Such a confined area of
fact-name, address, telephone number-seems unlikely to self-ex-
pand and therefore lessens the slipperiness of the slope. Privacy advo-
cates argue that the specific name of any given rape victim is not the
core issue of public interest. In the opinion of Helen Benedict, a Co-
lumbia University Journalism Professor, "The victim's identity adds
nothing to public understanding of rape because this information has
nothing to do with why the crime was committed. ' 43 Even the United
States Supreme Court implicitly agreed, defining the real "matter of
paramount public import" in these situations as being "the commis-
sion, and investigation, of a violent crime which had been reported to
authorities."" For the above reasons, bending the rules of the First
36. Julia A. Loquai, Comment, Keeping Tabs on the Press: Individual Rights v. Freedom
of the Press Under the First Amendment, 16 HAmUNS L. Rav. 447, 460-61 (1992).
37. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 1, at 1130; Work, supra note 4, at 211; Nix, supra note 29,
at Al.
38. See Denno, supra note 1, at 1130; Work, supra note 4, at 2! 1.
39. See Work, supra note 4, at 1130-31.
40. Fitzer, supra note 33.
41. Laura Myers, Lifting Veil of Secrecy in Rape Cases Called an Effort To Regain Control
of Crime, L.A. Tms, Apr. 5, 1992, at 5.
42. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
43. Helen Benedict, Panel Discussion: The Privacy Rights of Rape Victims, 61 FORDHIAM L.
REv. 1141, 1143 (1993); cf. Letters to the Editor, supra note 32, at A17 (final letter, asserting
"[y]our author's story would have been no more compelling with her byline").
44. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989).
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Amendment for rape victims is not highly vulnerable to the counter-
argument that this policy is a slippery slope leading to further censor-
ship of the press.
For that matter, the slope need not be limited to only the spectrum
that runs between free press and shackled press. Interestingly, the slip-
pery slope argument in this area was recharacterized by Justice
White's dissenting opinion in Florida Star v. B.J.F.41 Therein, Justice
White envisioned a slope-spectrum running between individual privacy
and public concern, arguing that overemphasizing the First Amend-
ment may "hit the bottom" of that slippery slope and leave individual
privacy unrecognized completely." Justice White posited that if the
fact that one has been violently, sexually assaulted is not recognizable
as a private fact, then classifying private facts will be unbearably diffi-
cult. 4
7
B. Policy Arguments in Favor of Publishing Victims' Names
"Regardless of how beneficent-sounding the purposes of control-
ling the press might be, we . . . remain intensely skeptical about those
measures that would allow government to insinuate itself into the edi-
torial rooms of this Nation's press." '
Members of the media and other supporters of press freedoms often
directly attempt to refute the issues that privacy advocates raise, in
addition to arguing their own extralegal points in favor of publicizing
victims' names. For example, media defenders agree with privacy ad-
vocates about the continued existence of a social stigma attached to
rape, but many media defenders feel strongly that the press can play
an important role in changing or eliminating rape stereotypes.49 This
theory is shared by former NBC News President Michael Gartner °
45. Id. at 551-53 (White, J., dissenting).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 550-51 (reasoning that "[if the First Amendment prohibits wholly private
persons ... from recovering for the publication of the fact that [they were] raped, I doubt that
there remain any 'private facts' which persons may assume will not be published in the newspa-
pers or broadcast on television").
48. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concur-
ring).
49. See, e.g., Michael Gartner, Panel Discussion: The Privacy Rights of Rape Victims, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1133-34 (1993); Nix, supra note 29, at Al (quoting Stephen Isaacs,
Associate Dean of Columbia University School of Journalism, as saying "[o]nce you routinely
name [rape victims], the stigma . . . would be abolished fairly quickly"); Fitzer, supra note 33
(pointing out that "[s]ome legal experts and newspaper editors have supported publishing the
names of rape victims, saying the stigma of rape could be removed if the media treated the crime
like any other").
50. See Gartner, supra note 49, at 1133.
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and Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz. s1 In the words
of Mr. Gartner, "[r]ape is a despicable crime of violence, and rapists
are deplorable people. Rape victims, on the other hand, are blameless.
One role of the press is to inform the public, and one way of inform-
ing the public is to destroy incorrect impressions and stereotypes. '5 2
An alternative version of this theory is that even if publication cannot
eliminate the stigma, publicity at least puts victims in a better position
for dealing with the ridicule or embarrassment.53 This is because the
media can serve as a forum for the victim to comment on the crime.
Media supporters take this theory a step further, alleging that rape
myths and the social stigma of rape are actually nourished by ano-
nymity.14 Professor Dershowitz argues that shielding the names of
rape victims reinforces "old sexist stereotypes."" Apparently, ano-
nymity may send an implicit message that rape is disgraceful.5 6 One
former president of the National Organization for Women pro-
claimed, "[K]eeping the hunted under wraps merely establishes her as
an outcast and implies that her chances for normal social relations are
doomed."I'
By espousing such theories, those who support publicizing rape vic-
tims' names refute the privacy advocates' theory that the name itself
has no public significance. Media defenders argue that a victim's
name is important because including the name serves the dual purpose
of better informing the public while lending a greater air of credibility
to the news report."s On these and other points which are also argued
by privacy advocates, supporters of press freedom have been quick to
highlight that there are two sides to the story.
There is another element to the debate, though, for which privacy
advocates have little or no response. Specifically, media defenders rely
heavily on the "chilling effect" argument: that legislatively imposed
prohibitions on the press, in any form, lead to exaggerated timidity
51. See Kenen, supra note 33 (summarizing Dershowitz's theories).
52. Gartner, supra note 49, at 1133. Mr. Gartner's comments also included, however, the
contradictory theory that the "function of journalists is not to change the world, or to change
the public's views. People who want to change the world should become teachers or politicians,
not newsmen and newswomen." Id.
53. See Myers, supra note 41, at 5.
54. See Gartner, supra note 49, at 1133 (arguing the media "are participating in a conspir-
acy of silence which does a disservice to the public by reinforcing the idea that there is something
shameful about being raped").
55. See Kenen, supra note 33 (quoting Professor Dershowitz).
56. See Denno, supra note 1, at 1124.
57. Karen DeCrow, Stop Treating Rape Victims as Pariahs; Print Names, USA TODAY,
April 4, 1990, at 8A.
58. See Gartner, supra note 49, at 1133.
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and editorial self-censorship. 9 Making the press liable for what it pub-
lishes, especially when that liability can result from publishing true
information such as an alleged victim's name, can cause the chilling
effect that diminishes the quality and quantity of information avail-
able to society.6 Courts tend to be diligent guardians against the chill-




The chilling effect is the underlying basis for Michael Gartner's
proposition that "producers, editors, and news directors should make
editorial decisions, rather than lawyers or legislatures." ' 62 The implica-
tion is that editors can be trusted to exercise discretion and courtesy
and might be likely to publish rape victims' names in extraordinary
cases only. In fact, almost all media organizations currently claim to
operate under some version of self-imposed censorship regarding the
identity of sexual assault victims. 6 3 For this reason, media defenders
argue, there is no need for the state to become involved. The risks
involved with legislative overreaching, such as by defining new areas
in which the media cannot publish new information, support the argu-
ment that shielding rape victims is a slippery slope leading to other
means of censoring the press.° Despite these arguments, state legisla-
tures have seen fit to enter the debate on the side of the victims.
III. EARLY LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DILEMMA, IN FLORIDA AND ELSEWHERE
Eighty-five years ago, on May 23, 1911, the Florida Legislature
passed a statute designed to ensure privacy for victims of rape.65 The
59. See generally Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1979) (discussing the chilling
effect); Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.
N.Y. 1989), affd, 916 F.2d 777 (2nd Cir. 1990); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 464-65
(E.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983).
60. See, e.g., Loquai, supra note 36, at 455.
61. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (stating the
Court's "reluctan[ce] to embark on a course" that would "invite timidity and self-censorship").
62. Gartner, supra note 49, at 1133.
63. Denno, supra note 1, at 1113; cf. Fitzer, supra note 33 (noting that journalism critics
consider publication of victims' names to be "a breach of journalistic ethics").
64. Legislators have shown little concern for avoiding giving the impression that censorship
would be limited to victims' names. Cf. e.g., Tim Nickens, The O.J. Effect? Juror Names May
Be Sealed, MtA HERALI, Apr. 27, 1995, at 10A (discussing proposed legislation to classify
jurors' names).
65. The statute originally provided:
Section 1. It is hereby made unlawful for any person or persons to print and publish
or cause to be printed and published in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or any
other publication in the State of Florida the name or identity of any female raped or
upon whom an assault with intent to commit rape has been committed or may be
committed.
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law prohibited printing and publishing victims' names. 6 This statute
remained in effect through late 1994-though in a slightly revised
form-and offered rape victims a cloak of anonymity behind which to
hide their emotional scars.67 Codified at section 794.03, Florida Sta-
tutes, the modern version protected any victim of "any sexual of-
fense" as defined in related statutes.68 Section 794.03 also made illegal
the "broadcast" of victims' identities, as opposed to mere publica-
tion, and referred to "any instrument of mass communication" to en-
sure that radio and television fell within the statute's sweep. 69
Florida was not the only state during the early 1900s to enact
such legislation. In 1909, South Carolina adopted a similar statute,
the modern version of which retains references only to "publication,"
"newspaper," and "magazine. ' 70 At about the same time, Georgia
enacted a rape victim privacy law that now prohibits all forms of
"public dissemination" of "the name or identity of any female" rape
Section 2. Whoever is convicted of the violation of the provisions of this Act shall be
punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the
County Jail for not more than twelve months, or by both such fine and imprisonment,
in the discretion of the court.
1911, Fla. Laws ch. 6226, § 1, 195, 195-96.
66. Id.
67. The language of section 794.03 is:
Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense vetim.-No
person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed, published,
or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other
identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense within this chapter.
Such identifying information is confidential and exempt from the provisions of s.
119.07(1). This exemption is subject to the O pen Government Sunset Review Act in
accordance with s. 119.14. An offense under this section shall constitute a misde-
meanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, or s. 775.083.
FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1995).
The confidentiality exemption referred to a Florida public records statute requiring records
custodians to permit "any person desiring to do so" to inspect and examine public records. FLA.
STAT. § 119.07(l)(a) (1995). The punishments provided for in sections 775.082 and 775.083 in-
clude a 60-day maximum imprisonment and a $500 maximum fine, respectively. FLA. STAT. §§
775.082(4)(b), .83(l)(e) (1995).
68. See FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1995). By referring to "any offense" under the surrounding
chapter, the updated version theoretically recognized physical sexual assaults other than tradi-
tional rape. See FLA. STAT. Ch. 794 (1995).
69. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1995).
70. South Carolina's law reads:
Publishing name of victim of criminal sexual conduct unlawful. Whoever publishes or
causes to be published the name of any person upon whom the crime of criminal
sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed in this State in
any newspaper, magazine or other publication shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars or imprisonment of not more than three years. The provisions of
this section shall not apply to publications made by order of court.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
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victim. 7 1 More recently, in 1987, Massachusetts joined those southern
states. The Massachusetts State Legislature amended a statute that
had previously only withheld rape records from public inspection.7 2
The amendment prohibited dissemination and disclosure of the con-
tents of those records and subjected violators to a far heftier fine than
in the three other states. 73 Notably, other states have also seen fit at
one time or another to enact similar legislation that is no longer in
effect. 74 However, the Georgia, South Carolina, and Massachusetts
statutes remain in effect.
From a policy perspective, the number of states that currently at-
tempt to maintain statutory anonymity for victims is such a small mi-
nority that the need for government intervention in the matter is
called into question." Why so many states do not have similar laws is
71. Under the Georgia Code:
a) It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and publish,
broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium of public dissemination
or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised, or disseminated in any
newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication published in this state or
through any radio or television broadcast originating in the state the name or identity
of any female who may have been raped or upon whom an assault with intent to
commit the offense of rape may have been made.
b) This Code section does not apply to truthful information disclosed in public court
documents open to public inspection.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-23 (1994).
72. See MASs. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 24C (1994).
73. See 1987 Mass. Acts 177, § 2 (amending MAss. GEN L. ch. 265, § 24C (1994) by adding
the third paragraph quoted below). The Massachusetts law closed public records of rape and
criminalized release of the victim's identity, providing in relevant part:
Victim's name; confidentiality. That portion of the records of a court or any police
department of the commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions, which contains
the name of the victim in an arrest, investigation or complaint for rape or assault with
intent to rape ... shall be withheld from public inspection, except with the consent of
a justice of such court where the complaint or indictment is or would be prosecuted.
Said portion of such court record or police record shall not be deemed to be a public
record....
Except as otherwise provided in this section, it shall be unlawful to publish, dissemi-
nate or otherwise disclose the name of any individual identified as an alleged victim of
any of the offenses described in the first paragraph. A violation of this section shall be
punishable by a fine of not less than two thousand five hundred dollars nor more than
ten thousand dollars.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 24C (1994).
74. E.g., Wisc. STAT. § 942.02 (1974) (relating to communication of the identity of sex
offense victims). That statute was enacted in 1925 but repealed, effective March 27, 1976. See
WISc. STAT. § 942.02 (1982).
75. When the constitutionality of section 794.03 came under attack a few years ago, as will
be explained in detail in part V of this Comment, the trial court concluded its opinion with the
following dicta:
The need for a criminal statute with punitive sanctions for such disclosures is deemed
necessary by the legislatures of only four states, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and
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open to speculation. One reason may be that other states do not share
Florida's public concern for the privacy interests of rape victims.
However, this seems unlikely considering the large number of states
that acknowledge the privacy interests of all citizens. 76 A better expla-
nation may be that other states prefer to allow the media to police
themselves in the hope that media indiscretions will be few so as not
to damage state interests. Such an explanation is supported by the fact
that mass media disclosures of rape victims' identities is such a rela-
tively recent phenomenon that before the mid-1980s the media could
be depended upon to operate under a self-imposed prohibition. 77 Mas-
sachusetts' 1987 statutory amendments might evidence that many
states did not have problems in the past with media disclosure but
now do.
A final speculation as to why so many states do not now have rape
victim privacy laws is that other states have taken note of the resis-
tance that Florida78 and Georgia 79 encountered from the judiciary re-
garding their statutes. Those other states may be waiting until some
state receives express judicial approval of a statutory scheme. Then,
that statute may serve as a model for the rest of the nation.80
As stated, for decades section 794.03 operated unobtrusively, cre-
ating no major controversy and drawing very little attention to itself."
Wisconsin. The fact that forty-six states are able to conduct sexual assault investiga-
tions and trials without punishing the press criminally for a disclosure of the victim's
identity is, in itself, a circumstance which leads this court to conclude that the state's
expressed concerns ... are somewhat exaggerated and overblown.
Globe 11, 622 So. 2d 1066, 1075-76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (quoting Globe I, No. 91-11008MM
A02 (Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994) (citations omit-
ted).
76. See Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 106.
77. See Editorial, Countering Rape's Stigma; The Best Course Is To Leave the Issue of
Identification with the Alleged Victim, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1991, at 6 (explaining that "[mlost
serious news organizations adhere to the policy of not revealing an alleged rape victim's name
... [this is the longstanding policy of The Times also"); Howard Kurtz, Smith's Accuser Lifts
the Mask; ABC Interview Ends ID Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1991, at Cl (explaining how
most national media had for months not printed the name of the alleged victim of Dr. William
Kennedy Smith, even though the name had been publicized at the beginning of the controversy);
see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
78. See infra parts IV & V.
79. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
80. Of course, Florida's first rape-victim-privacy statute operated for a significant period of
time without judicial resistance, and the majority of states did not use the law as a model then
either.
81. Throughout the statute's existence, aside from the case opinions discussed within this
Comment, only eight other state appellate court opinions ever cited the statute. See SsmPARD's
FLORMA CITATIONS (through Jan.. 1996 Supp.). None of those opinions questioned, limited, or
criticized the law. See id.
When the constitutionality of section 794.03 came under attack a few years ago, as will be
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Dissent arose twelve years ago when The Florida Star newspaper re-
ported the full name of a rape victim as part of a low-key, routine
column of "police blotter" stories.8 2 The litigation that stemmed from
that newspaper report reached the United States Supreme Court.83 The
resulting 1989 opinion included a lengthy discussion of the question-
able constitutionality of section 794.03, without actually ruling on the
matter.14
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE FLORmA STAR v.
B.J.F. OPINION
During the mid-1970s, the United States Supreme Court began a
cautious, case-by-case commentary concerning the constitutionality of
punishing the media for printing truthful information. The Florida
Star v. B.J.F.5 opinion is usually considered the last in a series of
related opinions dealing with the complex questions arising from such
state action.8 6 In each opinion, the Supreme Court stressed that its
decision was limited to the discrete factual context of the case under
consideration and cautioned that the decision was not to be applied
too broadly. 7 Yet, without exception, the Court held in favor of the
media.
First, in 1975, the Court issued its judgment in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn.88 In that case the Court found unconstitutional a civil
damages award against a television station for broadcasting a rape-
murder victim's name when that name was acquired from public judi-
cial records.8 9 Next, the Court decided Oklahoma Publishing Co. v.
District Court9 in 1977, finding unconstitutional a state court's order
explained further in this Comment, the trial court was unable to discover any "appellate decision
either reversing or sustaining a criminal conviction" under section 794.03. Globe II, 622 So. 2d
1066, 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (quoting Globe I, No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach County
Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
82. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527 (1989).
83. See id. at 524.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 1, at 1117-19. The series is commonly recognized as in-
cluding four or five important decisions. See generally Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Oklahoma Publishing Co.
v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979);
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 524.
87. E.g, Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 491 (stating "it is appropriate to focus on the nar-
rower interface between press and privacy that this case presents"); Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105
(warning that the "holding in this case is narrow").
88. 420 U.S. at 469.
89. Id. at 496-97.
90. 430 U.S. at 308.
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that enjoined the media from publishing the name and photograph of
a juvenile defendant when the media received that information by at-
tending an open hearing. 9' Soon thereafter, in 1979, the Supreme
Court held in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 92 that criminal sanc-
tions against two newspapers for publishing a juvenile defendant's
name without judicial approval were unconstitutional when the juve-
nile's name was obtained during interviews at the scene of the crime. 9
These three opinions served as guidance for the Supreme Court's 1989
decision regarding civil liability under section 794.03 of the Florida
Statutes.
In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,94 the Court specifically faced a situation
in which a rape victim brought a civil suit under section 794.03 against
a small newspaper 9 that had published a one-paragraph article which
included the victim's full name in describing a robbery and rape.96 The
newspaper learned of the name when a reporter-trainee copied verba-
tim a police report that had been placed in the public pressroom at the
police department. 97 After The Florida Star published the piece,
B.J.F. alleged emotional distress, claimed that previously unknowing
co-workers and acquaintances heard about the article, and alleged
that her mother had received several intimidating telephone calls from
a man threatening to rape B.J.F. again. 98
The trial judge who had presided over the case felt that section
794.03 "reflected a proper balance between the First Amendment and
privacy rights, as it applied only to a narrow set of 'rather sensitive
... criminal offenses'."" The jury awarded B.J.F. $75,000 as com-
pensatory damages and $25,000 as punitive damages on the basis that
The Florida Star had shown "reckless indifference."'00 The First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal agreed with the outcome of the trial court, but
the United States Supreme Court did not.'0'
It is critical to note that the Supreme Court opinion does not con-
demn legislative attempts at balancing First Amendment rights against
privacy rights. Rather, open-minded scholars may fairly infer from
91. Id.
92. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
93. Id. at 104.
94. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
95. The Florida Star had an average circulation of 18,000 copies. 491 U.S. at 526.
96. Id. at 527.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 528.
99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 529.
101. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), rev'd, 491 U.S. 524
(1989).
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the opinion that balancing is acceptable-even proper-as long as the
state's interests serve as the fulcrum upon which the competing rights
are balanced. The default position of the scale tips in favor of the
First Amendment, and only a "state interest of the highest order" will
support a scale that tips in favor of privacy*102
The framework of this analysis was articulated in Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co.103 Specifically, the rule of law states that "if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance[,] then state officials may not constitutionally pun-
ish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order."' 14 Even the Supreme Court admitted
that this principle leaves open the possibility of legally shifting the
scale away from the pro-press default position. 05 The Court simply
concluded that the facts of the Florida Star case did not raise Flori-
da's interests to the level of the "highest order."10
For the sake of the Florida Star litigation, the State of Florida ar-
gued that there were three state interests underlying section 794.03:
the privacy of sexual assault victims, physical safety of those victims,
and encouragement that would motivate those victims to report sexual
assaults and assist in prosecution of such offenses.101 The Supreme
Court conceded that in all circumstances those interests "are highly
significant"' 108 and that under certain unspecified circumstances those
interests would be strong enough to support a scale leaning towards
privacy. l09
Three factors led the Court to conclude that the particulars of
B.J.F.'s situation did not satisfy the Daily Mail test. First, the source
from which the newspaper had learned B.J.F.'s name was the govern-
ment, which had erroneously, illegally, and inadvertently included
B.J.F.'s name in the copy of an incident report that the police had
placed in the station's pressroom." 0 In light of the fact that the
102. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
103. 443 U.S. at 97.
104. Id. at 103.
105. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 ("We do not hold that truthful publication is auto-
matically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the
State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press."). Justice White posited that if
sexual assault victimization is not within the zone of personal privacy referred to in Florida Star,
he would be hard-pressed to identify what was within the zone. See id. at 550-51 (White, J.,
dissenting).
106. Id. at 541 (concluding "that no such interest is satisfactorily served by imposing liability
under § 794.03 to appellant under the facts of this case").
107. Id. at 537.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 538.
1995]
530 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:513
government "failed to police itself in disseminating information," the
Court was loathe to countenance punishment of the media for the
same infraction. 11' The Court suggested that the State should have
compensated B.J.F.,"2 a statement presumably suggesting something
more than or different from the $2,500 pre-trial settlement reached
between B.J.F. and the police department." 3
The second factor that compelled the Court to rule as it did was
that the trial judge found The Florida Star negligent per se without
consideration of whether the particular revelation about B.J.F. was
one that a reasonable person would have found highly offensive.' 14
The Court explained that such a cut-and-dried standard, with liability
following automatically from publication, was unconstitutional in
light of the numerous possible combinations of facts that might lessen
the significance of the state's interests in any given case." 5 Another
downfall of the per se standard used under section 794.03 was the lack
of any scienter element. 16 Simply put, "individualized adjudication"
would be constitutionally necessary to balance privacy rights against
press freedoms."17
Third, the Court assumed that a "backyard gossip" could be
equally as damaging to the interests of the victim as could an "instru-
ment of mass communication.""' 8 Such a possibility persuaded the
Court that the high significance of Florida's interests could be under-
cut by "the facial underinclusiveness of section 794.03."" 9 In other
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 528.
114. See id. at 539.
115. See id. (listing examples such as: 1) when the community already knows the victim's
identity, 2) when the victim him/herself calls public attention to the assault, 3) when the victim's
identity itself becomes a reasonable subject of public concern).
116. Id. "Scienter" is an intent standard.
117. Cf. id. at 4.
118. See id. (speculating that an "individual who maliciously spreads word . . . to persons
who live near, or work with, the victim may [cause] consequences as devastating as the exposure
of her name to large numbers of strangers").
This speculation logically may lead one to wonder whether Desiree Washington, whom former
heavyweight boxing champion Mike Tyson was convicted of raping, would have suffered the
same consequences if knowledge of her identity had been limited to only 30 or so people. See
Tyson's Rape Victim Declares She's Been "Tried, Convicted, " INraNAPous NEws, Jan. 27,
1993, at El (describing Washington's feelings about being "trapped by the publicity surrounding
her," not being able to enjoy her life, having no privacy, and quoting Washington as saying that
she "can't heal and [she] can't get better and [she is] finding it hard to love and open up"); see
also Tyson Victim "in Prison," NEWSDAY MAG., Jan. 27, 1993, at 133; Tyson's Rape Victim
Says Publicity About Case Has Her in Prison, Too, INDIAAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 27, 1993, at E2.
For further commentary on the distinctions between mass communication and small-scope com-
munication, see infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
119. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540.
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words, Florida could not constitutionally balance privacy rights
against press freedoms without doing so evenhandedly, which at least
meant defining "press" broadly enough to include "the smalltime dis-
seminator as well as the media giant.""0
Although the United States Supreme Court identified constitutional
problems with section 794.03, the Court did not force Florida to re-
move the law from the statute books. Rather, the Florida Star opinion
simply concluded that Florida's interests were not of the highest order
within the context of B.J.F.'s situation. This conclusion did not neces-
sarily mean that section 794.03 could never function constitutionally.
However, within the context of another situation that arose only two
years after the Florida Star litigation ended, Florida's courts entirely
dismantled section 794.03 pursuant to the conclusion implicit in the
earlier analysis of the United States Supreme Court.
V. THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT INVOKED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
SECTION 794.03 BY THE FLORIDA COURTS
In early 1991, a young Palm Beach County woman accused William
Kennedy Smith, nephew of Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy,
of rape.'21 Various media sources eventually revealed that her name
was Patricia Bowman, but initially Ms. Bowman remained anony-
mous to the public at large. Immediately after the police learned of
the alleged rape, many reporters began investigating the story. 122 One
such reporter, Kenneth Harrell, worked for a Palm Beach County tab-
loid called The Globe. 23 During Mr. Harrell's conventional investiga-
tion, he learned the name of Mr. Smith's accuser from at least ten
different people.' u Notably, the initial revelation of Patricia Bow-
man's identity did not involve any public records because no prosecu-
tion had begun yet. 125 That fact ought to have somewhat lessened the
applicability of the Cox Broadcasting decision, which relied heavily on
120. Id. Assumedly, the 18,000-copy circulation of The Florida Star placed that newspaper
in the category of "media giant" as opposed to "smalltime disseminator."
121. Where Was Teddy? (Police Concerned About Sen. Edward Kennedy's Behavior After
His Nephew William Smith Was Accused of Rape), TtaE MAO., May 20, 1991, at 27.
122. Globe II, 622 So. 2d 1066, 1068-69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (quoting Globe 1, No. 91-
11008MM A02 (Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
123. Id. at 1068.
124. Those sources-some met by Mr. Harrell while he staked-out the accuser's home-in-
cluded various acquaintances of the accuser, other reporters, a Palm Beach County Victim Serv-
ices coordinator, and former relatives of the accuser. Id. at 1068-69.
125. Ms. Bowman's name did not enter the public records until May 9, 1991, when the State
Attorney filed an information with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County accus-
ing Smith of sexual battery and simple battery. Globe II, 622 So. 2d at 1069 (quoting Globe I,
No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)).
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the reporter's use of public records to determine the victim's iden-
tity.I26 On the other hand, the nature of Mr. Harrell's sources ought
to have heightened the applicability of the Daily Mail decision, which
involved reporters who had learned a juvenile defendant's identity by
interviewing witnesses at the scene of the crime. 127 However, in the
final legal analysis of all the Florida courts that addressed the case,
the source of Ms. Bowman's identity had relatively little impor-
tance. 28
Two Globe issues identified Ms. Bowman as the alleged victim and
offered other identifying information about her. 29 However, before
The Globe released those issues, four different British newspapers had
already published Ms. Bowman's name, and one of those papers had
included a photograph. 30 Newsstands in America's major cities and in
South Florida distributed at least a small number of copies of each of
those British tabloids. 3' The fact that The Globe was merely repeating
information that had already been publicized was significant in the
subsequent legal analysis . 2
Within forty-eight hours of the arrival of the" first Globe issue at
newsstands, both NBC News and the New York Times informed their
audiences that Patricia Bowman was the name of the alleged victim."'
Many newspapers and other media followed suit during the succeed-
ing days.1'4 Some cited to other media outlets' earlier decisions about
identifying Ms. Bowman; thus, they used either the "old news" the-
ory or the "everybody's doing it" theory to excuse themselves from
supposed breaches of their own codes of conduct.' On the other
hand, NBC News had decided to print the name because of more
broadly based beliefs about the proper role of the press and how the
126. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492-96 (1975).
127. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1979).
128. See infra parts V.A. through V.C.
129. The first issue was released on April 15, 1991, with a cover date of April 23, while the
second issue was released April 22, 1991, with a cover date of April 30. Globe II, 622 So. 2d
1066, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (quoting Globe 1, No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach County
Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
130. Among the newspapers were THE SUNDAY MIRROR, TODAY, and PEOPLE. Id. One of
those, Tim SUNDAY MIRROR, had a circulation of nearly three million copies. Id.
131. Id.
132. See infra part V.
133. See infra part V. (referring to NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 16,
1991)).
134. Id.
135. E.g., Todd Rosenthal, Alleged Victim at Kennedy Estate Is Millionaire's Stepdaughter,
REUTERs NEwswiRi, Apr. 17, 1991 (justifying the revelation of Ms. Bowman's identity by stat-
ing that "Reuters, which normally does not identify rape victims, has decided to publish the
woman's name because it is now public knowledge due to her identification by other news or-
ganisations like the New York Times and NBC television").
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press should perform that role. 3 6 From the outset of the revelation of
Ms. Bowman's identity, debate "raged" again about the propriety of
identifying sexual assault victims in the media.137
Acting almost as if The Globe had been the only news organization
bold enough to publish the name of Smith's alleged victim, the State
of Florida sought to enforce section 794.03 against Globe Communi-
cations Corporation.' The State's complaint, called an "informa-
tion," charged the publisher with two counts of criminal violation of
section 794.03: one count for the April 23rd issue of The Globe, and
another count for the April 30th issue. 39 Globe Communications re-
sponded with a motion to dismiss the information. 40 The media cor-
poration argued, primarily, that section 794.03 was facially violative
of the constitutions of both Florida and the United States and, sec-
ondarily, that section 794.03 was also unconstitutional as applied to
the facts of their case.14'
A. The Trial Court Opinion
The Circuit Court for Palm Beach County addressed each of Globe
Communications' arguments. First, the court focused on The Globe's
argument that section 794.03 was overbroad due to its categorical pro-
hibition against media dissemination of rape victims' names. 42 The
overbreadth problem arises from the possibility that an alleged vic-
tim's name is true information, lawfully obtained, and within the pub-
lic interest itself or closely related to public interest material. 43 When
all three of those potentialities are fulfilled, as they were here, the
First Amendment protects the information unless the state supersedes
with a compelling interest "of the highest order."' Accordingly, the
basis of the newspaper's overbreadth argument was that section
794.03 could be read to criminalize the publication of a name even in
a case in which all three factors were met and in which the state's
interests did not overcome the protection offered by the First Amend-
ment. 45
136. See Gartner, supra note 49, at 1133-34.
137. See, e.g., Fitzer, supra note 33; Kenen, supra note 33.
138. Globe II, 622 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (citing Globe I, No. 91-11008MM
A02 (Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1069.
142. Id. at 1070.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
145. Such was almost the case in Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524 (1989), except that the possible
liability there was civil rather than criminal.
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The State v. Globe Communications Corp. (Globe 1) trial court im-
plied that if the state's interests are not in every case unmistakably
more compelling than the fundamental safeguard for free speech of-
fered by the First Amendment, 146 then a "strict liability" statute such
as section 794.03 is overbroad and must be stricken. 14 7
In Globe I the State asserted virtually the same compelling interests
as in Florida Star. The State of Florida wants to encourage victims to
report sexual assaults and thereby enhance the state's ability to appre-
hend and prosecute the alleged perpetrators, and, at the same time, it
wants to shield the victims from ridicule and embarrassment. 148 The
trial court conceded that the State's asserted interests were supported
by "considerable logic" and that shield laws may be "desirable."' 49
However, the trial court concluded that, as a blanket proposition, the
asserted state interests simply are not unerringly more compelling than
First Amendment protection.10
Finding no mechanism for distinguishing between individual situa-
tions-to determine whether in any particular case the state's interests
overcome the First Amendment-the trial court deemed section
794.03 unconstitutionally overbroad.' 5 ' The statute's specific
146. Some First Amendment scholars might argue that no government interest could ever be
more compelling than the First Amendment in any situation. This author submits that such si-
tuations can exist. For example, a statute criminalizing unauthorized dissemination of the United
States' active nuclear missile launch codes would house a greater government national security
interest, more compelling than the First Amendment.
147. Globe H1, 622 So. 2d 1066, 1071-73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (quoting Globe 1, No. 91-
11008MM A02 (Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994). This
was in contrast to the Florida Star situation, which involved an unconstitutional application of
the statute, but the United States Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to strike down
section 794.03 entirely. In fact, the Court expressly conceived of the possibility that section
794.03 could function constitutionally. See 491 U.S. at 537 ("We accordingly do not rule out the
possibility that, in a proper case, imposing civil sanctions . . might be so overwhelmingly neces-
sary to advance these interests as to satisfy the Daily Mail standard.")
148. Globe 11, 622 So. 2d at 1070 (quoting Globe I, No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach
County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)). The interests were virtually the same as those asserted in the Florida
Star litigation. See supra text accompanying note 107.
149. Globe II, 622 So. 2d at 1070-71 (quoting Globe I, No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach
County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)). This might qualify as an understatement in light of the United States
Supreme Court's recognition that those interests are at the very least "highly significant" and
could be of the highest order "in a proper case." See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537 (noting that
"we are daily reminded of the tragic reality of rape"). See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (stating that the interests underlying claims of privacy "are plainly rooted
in the traditions and significant concerns of our society"). Yet that "proper case" qualification
goes to the core of the overbreadth issue.
150. Globe 11, 622 So. 2d at 1071 (quoting Globe !, No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach
County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)) (finding that "enforcement of such [shield] laws collides with First
Amendment claims of the press to comment freely on a matter of public interest which is what
the defendant is accused of doing in the case at bar").
151. Id. at 1073.
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deficiency in this regard was its failure to provide for case-by-case
hearings, 15 2 which the United States Supreme Court referred to in the
Florida Star opinion as indispensable "individualized adjudica-
tion."' 5 3 Unfortunately, neither the trial court in Globe I nor the
United States Supreme Court in Florida Star offered very specific ad-
vice about the procedural aspects of such individualized adjudication.
The "when, how, and who" of the hearings are important details that
may in fact erode the potential effectiveness of hearings as a cure for
overbreadth.l14
Both courts, however, did provide good advice about the substan-
tive aspects of the hearings. The trial court quoted a passage from the
Florida Star opinion in which the Supreme Court suggested a few
case-specific factual issues that would be relevant in determining
whether the State's interests were of the highest order. Those issues
included:
whether the identity of the victim is already known throughout the
community; whether the victim has voluntarily called public
attention to the offense; or whether the identity of the victim has
otherwise become a reasonable subject of public concern-because,
perhaps, questions have arisen whether the victim fabricated an
assault by a particular person . 5
More factors would undoubtedly be necessary for properly determin-
ing the balance between privacy interests and press freedoms in any
given case, but this provided a substantial start.15 6 The point of the
152. Id.
153. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540 (discussing one of many problems with section 794.03:
"liability follows automatically from publication").
154. This is demonstrated by some problems with Florida's new victim-privacy law; these
problems stem from the legislative attempt to provide individualized adjudication.
The possibilities of, and problems with, using case-by-case hearings selectively to enforce rape-
victim-privacy are further explored and critiqued infra part VI.B.4.
155. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 539 (quoted in Globe , No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach
County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)).
156. The Globe I trial court engaged in an "as applied" analysis, which for all intents and
purposes is the same as the case-by-case analysis recommended to cure section 794.03's over-
breadth problems, except that such analysis ought to be engaged in before prosecution rather
than after. At that time, the trial court noted some relevant facts about Ms. Bowman's situation
that went beyond the scope of the Florida Star list. Specifically among these were the facts that
Ms. Bowman's "identity had been published by several British tabloid-type newspapers before
the Globe published her name;" a possible "clear and present danger to [a] victim prior to the
identification and apprehension of the alleged perpetrator" was absent; and no threat of a dan-
ger to the criminal justice system existed from publishing Ms. Bowman's name. Globe 11, 622
So. 2d 1066, 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (quoting Globe I, No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach
County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
536 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 23:513
overbreadth issue is that additional factors were not available, thus
preventing such balancing.
Having decided the overbreadth issue, the trial court analyzed
Globe Communications' underinclusiveness argument. The court
framed the question as whether section 794.03 was underinclusive
"because it leaves unprohibited appreciable damage to a supposedly
valid state interest.' 117 The express language of the statute prohibited
identification of rape victims only in "instrument[s] of mass commu-
nication."'t When the United States Supreme Court examined the
underinclusiveness aspect of section 794.03 pursuant to the Florida
Star opinion, it concluded that the freedom of smaller disseminators
and individuals to identify rape victims possibly eroded the signifi-
cance of the state interests that section 794.03 was designed to pro-
tect. 159 The Court reasoned that any person who "maliciously spreads
word of the identity . . . is thus not covered, despite the fact that the
communication of such information to persons who live near, or work
with, the victim may have consequences as devastating as the exposure
of her name to large numbers of strangers."1 60
The Globe I trial court, perhaps feeling compelled to mimic the
Florida Star opinion on the underinclusiveness issue, advised that the
prohibition must be applied evenhandedly. 6' The statute needs "in-
clusive precautions against dissemination by informants who are not
representatives of large media"; i.e., the State may not distinguish be-
tween a backyard gossip's conversations and The Miami Herald's
publicity, however different the two may be in reality. 162 The court's
implication is that the First Amendment will not permit a distinction
between two people having a discussion and 200,000 people reading
publicity in a newspaper article. That somewhat unrealistic 163 analysis
seems to focus on the speaker, as did the trial court in Globe I and the
United States Supreme Court in Florida Star. This argument weakens
if focus is placed on the audience, or on the realistic meaning of the
157. Id.
158. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1995).
159. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540 (ruling that "the facial underinclusiveness of § 794.03
raises serious doubts about whether Florida is, in fact, serving, with this statute, the significant
interests..." asserted).
160. Id.
161. Globe II, 622 So. 2d at 1073-74 (quoting Globe I, No. 91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach
County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)) (citing Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540).
162. Id. at 1074.
163. In this regard, Patricia Bowman's and Desiree Washington's experiences demonstrate
the reality of mass publicity compared to small-scope publicity. See supra note 118.
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word "publicity." 16 Differentiating situations based on the speaker's
audience is surely possible within First Amendment jurisprudence,
even if rarely done. This is exemplified by certain "hostile audi-
ence,"'6 6 obscenity,'" and defamation cases. 167 On the other hand,
these few distinctions based on audience could be attributed to the
audience's psychological characteristics-such as maturity or atti-
tude-rather than to sheer numbers.'" Still, the idea that the First
Amendment is blind to the difference between mass communication
and small-scope communication seems to be based more on legal the-
ory than on practicalities.
The trial court next tackled the issue of whether section 794.03 op-
erated as a prior restraint. The United States Supreme Court had
dodged that same question in 1989.'6 The answer offered in Globe I
was that section 794.03 was most likely not a prior restraint. 170
164. For example, the Ninth Circuit once explained:
There is an obvious and substantial difference between the disclosure of private facts
to an individual-a disclosure that is selective and based on a judgment as to whether
knowledge by that person would be felt to be objectionable-and the disclosure of the
same facts to the public at large. The former, as the Restatement recognizes, does not
constitute publicizing or public communication ... and accordingly does not destroy
the private character of the facts disclosed.
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); see
also WEasTrER's NEw TwENTwmT CENTURY UNA.RtDoGED DICTIONARY 1457 (2d ed. 1983) (defin-
ing publicity as "commonly known, or open to the knowledge of a community").
165. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (affirming conviction of streetcorner
speaker who insulted politicians and minorities, on the basis that the audience was disorderly
and unruly); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (explaining that breach of the
peace includes "words likely to produce violence in others"). The Court in Cantwell suggested
that "[no one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech
sanctions incitement to riot[,] ... disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or
other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order." Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308.
166. For example, even if sexual material might be suitable for adults, the state can regulate
or ban that material when the intended audience consists of children. See Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). Also, the standards used by juries to decide whether sexual material is
obscene may be altered when the material is "designed for and primarily disseminated to a
clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large." Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502, 508 (1966).
167. Many jurisdictions recognize defamation only when the defamatory meaning of a publi-
cation is acknowledged by a "right-thinking" community. E.g., Kimmerle v. New York Evening
Journal, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1933) (defining the New York standard as dependent on the
minds of "right-thinking persons"). The practical effect of this rule is that criminals cannot
recover for having had their criminal abilities insulted within a criminal peer group. See Note,
The Community Segment in Defamation Actions: A Disenting Essay, 58 YA.E L.J. 1387 (1949).
168. But see Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d at 1125-27. However, in a non-First Amendment
context, defamation is still defamation whether the audience consists of 200,000 people or only
one person. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSsER & KEETON ON TORTS § 111 (5th ed. 1984).
169. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 n.9. (1989).
170. Globe II, 622 So. 2d 1066, 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (quoting Globe I, No.
91-11008MM A02 (Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)) (deciding the statute "is probably not
a 'prior restraint' "), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
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However, the trial court's decision was based on confusing logic.
First, the court noted that several types of prior restraints are identifi-
able. 71 Second, the court explained that the legal standards are the
same for prior restraints and subsequent punishments; i.e., legislative
enactments proscribing punishment after publication are subject to
the same scrutiny as pre-publication injunctions and licensure sys-
tems. 7 2 But in the end the court simply referred to the careful review
it had already applied to the overbreadth issue and relied on that anal-
ysis to find section 794.03 unconstitutional. 73 The trial court some-
how reached the conclusion that section 794.03 "is probably not a
'prior restraint' as that term has been traditionally used" by relying
on the conclusion that "no valid competing state interest is served by
punishing defendant for publishing a truthful account of information
it had lawfully acquired."1 74 Even more confusing is the court's seem-
ingly contradictory later statement that section 794.03 is in the nature
of a prior restraint. 17 Evidently the trial court's holding did not rely
on the prior restraint analysis.
Finally, the trial court specifically examined section 794.03 under
the microscope provided by the Florida Constitution. 76 The court
concluded that the state constitution offers protection "at least as
broad" as that of the First Amendment 77 and that further comment
would therefore have been superfluous. Thus, the court simply pro-
nounced section 794.03 to be equally violative of both the Florida
Constitution and the United States Constitution. 78
B. The District Court of Appeal Opinion
After quoting in full the trial court's opinion, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in State v. Globe Communications Corp. (Globe I1)
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1074-75.
173. Id. at 1075.
174. See id. at 1074-75.
175. Id. at 1076.
176. Id. at 1075. The relevant portion of the Florida Constitution is article 1, section 4,
stating that "[elvery person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects but shall
be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
177. The court based the conclusion primarily on the lack of contrary controlling precedent
in Florida. See Globe 1I, 622 So. 2d 1066, 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (quoting Globe I, No. 91-
11008MM A02 (Palm Beach County Ct. Oct. 21, 1991)), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
However, the conclusion that press protection in Florida is at least as broad as federal constitu-
tional protection is curious. The federal Constitution simply states that no law may be passed
'abridging the freedom of . . . the press," while the Florida Constitution provides the caveat
that speakers "shall be responsible for abuse" of their rights. Compare U.S. CoNST. amend. I
with FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 4. The differences in language raise many interesting arguments that
are unfortunately beyond the scope of this comment.
178. Globe II, 622 So. 2d at 1075.
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added its own thoughtful analysis.""5 Whereas the lower tribunal had
done a thorough job of identifying the theoretical legal deficiencies of
section 794.03, Judge Harry Lee Anstead, writing for the majority, 180
went beyond that to offer suggestions on how the state's "rights could
be served by measures less drastic."'' The opinion therefore can ac-
company the United States Supreme Court's Florida Star opinion as a
guide for curing the unconstitutional effects of applying a statute such
as section 794.03 in every situation-what the appellate court called
"using a shotgun when a highly accurate rifle is required."' 8 2
First, the appellate court more fully developed the Florida Star
dicta that had chided the government for having been the entity di-
rectly responsible for informing The Florida Star about B.J.F.'s iden-
tity. "'83 The appellate court suggested that the State of Florida more
plainly classify rape victims' names as confidential and then create a
cause of action for breach of confidentiality.' 1 4 From a theoretical,
legal standpoint, shifting the burden of compensatory liability from
the press to the government sidesteps the scope of the First Amend-
ment altogether. A law that forces the government to compensate rape
victims if those victims' names are published certainly is not a law
"abridging the freedom of . . . the press.' " 8 The practical result of
such burden-shifting is to eliminate the dangerous "chilling effect" of
self-censorship.
Next, the appellate court suggested that a more narrowly tailored
statute would have expressly recognized the risk to the victims' safety
in those situations where the rapist had not yet been apprehended. 8 6
Also, the court implicitly recommended that the Legislature officially
take notice of any evidence that might indicate that victim safety was
an unusually high concern in the case of rape as compared to other
crimes.8 7 The court requested similar empirical evidence for support
of the proposition that anonymity is an integral motivation for rape
victims to report their victimization.'88 The appellate court recognized,
however, that rewriting section 794.03 is a legislative task and that the
179. See Globe 11, 622 So. 2d at 1076-81.
180. Judge Anstead is now an Associate Justice of the Florida Supreme Court.
181. Globe II, 622 So. 2d at 1078.
182. Id. at 1079.
183. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538 (1989) (theorizing that section 794.03
could "hardly be said to be narrowly tailored" in those situations wherein the "the government
has failed to police itself indisseminating information").
184. See Globe II, 622 So. 2d at 1079 (proposing "a determination by the state to maintain
confidentiality within its own ranks and records, and a provision for sanctions upon breach").
185. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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courts would not accept the burden of engaging in analysis as done in
Florida Star each time a media outlet is prosecuted. 18 9
Judge Anstead, writing for the court, offered to the Legislature one
other piece of advice, similar to what the United States Supreme
Court had noted in Florida Star.190 The phrase "instrument of mass
communication" is too ambiguous for use in a statute such as section
794.03. The Globe II court reiterated the need for a better definition
of "the press" to serve the dual purpose of evading void-for-vague-
ness claims and averting underinclusiveness challenges. 191 In sum, af-
ter agreeing with the trial court as to almost all details of analysis, the
appellate court affirmed the order striking section 794.03 as unconsti-
tutional facially and as-applied. 192
C. The Florida Supreme Court Opinion
After such thorough analysis by both lower state courts, not much
was left for the Florida Supreme Court to say since it found itself in
agreement with the preceding decisions. Writing for the majority,
Justice Kogan referred often to the opinions below and quoted at
length from the persuasive opinion "above" (Florida Star v. B.J.F. 193)
to show that the Florida Supreme Court approved of and agreed with
those decisions. 194
In affirming the facial unconstitutionality of section 794.03, the
court did not feel compelled to extend the already long list of flaws
with the statute. The opinion simply reviewed the overbreadth and un-
derinclusiveness of the express language of the statute. 19 Additionally,
as the appellate court had done, the Florida Supreme Court declined
the State's invitation to "interpret" away any infirmities of section
794.03 by inferring affirmative defenses and adopting carefully
phrased jury instructions. 19
In doing so, the court took the same opportunity that the Fourth
District had taken and gently, yet clearly, encouraged the Florida
Legislature to rewrite section 794.03.197 Together, the three courts'
189. Id. at 1080.
190. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) (pointing out that the statute does
not define the phrase "instrument of mass communication").
191. Globe 11, 622 So. 2d at 1081.
192. Id.
193. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
194. Globe 111, 648 So. 2d 110, 112-13 (Fla. 1994).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 113.
197. Id. at 113-14 (concluding first that "[r]ewriting would be necessary" and then further
encouraging the Legislature by stating "we do not rule out the possibility that the legislature
could fashion a statute that would pass constitutional muster").
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opinions suggest that allowing a narrow exception to the First Amend-
ment for some rape victims is not per se invalid in the eyes of the law.
Even the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Florida Star v.
B.J.F. is in accord with this implication. Understandably, the Florida
Legislature went back to the drawing board to create a new statutory
scheme. 198 The Legislature did not merely amend section 794.03.
Rather, the Legislature passed a new package of interrelated statutes.
VI. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE FLORIDA JuDICIARY: THE NEW
"CRIME VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT"
Only six months after State v. Globe Communications Corp.,199 the
Florida Legislature enacted a new strategy for shielding rape victims'
identities. 200 The Florida Legislature considered, amended, and
unanimously 0' passed the Crime Victims Protection Actm during the
eight-week period between March 8, 1995 and May 5, 1995.203 The Act
took effect on October 1, 1995.2 It included three new statutes de-
signed to function cooperatively to achieve the effect that the Legisla-
ture sought in a manner that would survive judicial scrutiny.
Although the Legislature's desired effect is of high social value, this
Comment predicts that the judiciary still will not be satisfied.
A. Content of the New Act
1. Legislative Findings and Purpose
In the preamble to the Crime Victims Protection Act, the Legisla-
ture expressly stated its motivations and reasoning, as well as the State
of Florida's interests.?°5 Not surprisingly, the interests asserted in 1995
were the same as the interests asserted in 1993 and 1994 for the State
198. Id.
199. Id. at 110.
200. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-207, § 8, 1832, 1835 ("Became a law without the Governor's
approval June 9, 1995.").
201. See FLA. S. Jou.. 385 (Reg. Sess. April 21, 1995) (memorializing a vote of 38 in favor
and 0 opposed); FLA. H.R. JouR. 876 (Reg. Sess. April 27, 1995) (memorializing a vote of 115 in
favor and 0 opposed); FLA. S. JourR. 1107-09 (Reg. Sess. May 5, 1995) (memorializing a vote of
36 in favor and 0 opposed).
202. FIA. S. JOUR. 1107-09 (Reg. Sess. May 5, 1995).
203. FLA. LEGIs., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BEtL INFORMATION, 1995 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
SENATE Bmns at 65, SB 496.
204. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-207, § 8, 1832, 1835 (enacting the Crime Victims Protection
Act).
205. Fla. SB 496, § 2(1) (1995).
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of Florida v. Globe Communications Corp. litigation6 and in 1989
for the Florida Star v. B.J.F. case. 201
In response to the Fourth District Court of Appeal's request, 208 the
Legislature provided some statistical evidence to substantiate its belief
in the compelling nature of the State's interests. 209 At least one draft
of the Act cited data implying that fear of identification is fundamen-
tal to victims' decisions to "refrain from reporting and prosecuting
sexual crimes.''210 Specifically, according to the Legislature, sixty per-
cent of sexual crime victims share "fear of disclosure of their iden-
tity" as a primary concern; sixty-six percent of victims would be more
likely to report crimes if given statutorily enforced anonymity; and
eighty-four percent of sexual crimes go unreported. 21 1
The second and third set of statistics appear to contradict the
State's argument that statutorily enforced anonymity will meet the
State's interests. Apparently, as many as eighty-four percent of sex
crimes went unreported even though Florida has had a rape victim
privacy statute since 1911. Furthermore, broadly based percentages
should be irrelevant considering that privacy concerns may constitu-
tionally outweigh free press concerns only through individualized ad-
judication.2 1 2 The real issue is whether any specific individual victim
will, without anonymity, be amenable to reporting a crime and assist-
ing or participating in a rape prosecution. 213  The Legislature
attempted in the new Act to address this issue, which goes to the
206. See supra text accompanying note 148.
207. See supra text accompanying note 107.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
209. The Florida Legislature has maintained its assertion that these interests are always com-
pelling. See Fla. SB 496, J 2(1) (1995). The reviewing courts were not quite in agreement with the
Legislature on that point, but they have openly acknowledged that protecting rape victims from
ridicule and danger and encouraging those victims to report the crimes are highly significant
interests that can often be compelling enough to suspend First Amendment privileges narrowly.
See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989) (admitting that "in a proper case, imposing
.. .sanctions . . . might . . . advance these interests as to satisfy the Daily Mail standard");
Globe III, 648 So. 2d 110, 114 (Fla. 1994) (admitting that "the legislature could fashion a statute
that would pass constitutional muster").
210. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-207, § 2, 1832, 1832.
211. Fla. SB 496 (draft of April 21, 1995).
212. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540.
213. The narrower question of whether any given victim who would not receive anonymity
would be more or less willing to report a sexual crime is probably impossible to answer within
the confines of feasible constitutional balancing. The state cannot adjudicate the question until
after the crime has been reported, which means in all practicality that the state cannot adjudicate
the question at all. Theoretically, the best practical (though not necessarily legal) way to adjudi-
cate the issue would be to have rape victims talk to judges before talking to the police. However,
the trial court system is unlikely to have the means by which to cope fairly and efficiently with
such a procedure.
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practical functioning of the individualized adjudication require-
ment.2 14 The provision for individualized adjudication is but one of
many differences between the Crime Victims Protection Act and the
formerly effective section 794.03. In the next sections, this Comment
will briefly survey the new Act in its entirety and then scrutinize sev-
eral of its portions.
2. Brief Overview of the Three New Statutes Created by the
"Crime Victims Protection Act"
The Crime Victims Protection Act ' is designed to function only
when case-by-case examination demonstrates that the scenario in
question raises the state's interests to the point of being "compel-
ling. ' 216 The Act recognizes five independent characteristics, which
originated in dicta of the United States Supreme Court and the Flor-
ida Fourth District Court of Appeal. These characteristics must be
shown before the rape victim may receive protective anonymity; 21 7
they are listed within a new statute, codified by the Act at section
92.56, Florida Statutes.2 1 1 When either the victim or the state demon-
strates the existence of all five characteristics, 219 section 92.56 takes
effect and shields the alleged victim from public exposure. All court
records that reveal the victim's name, address, or photograph immedi-
ately become confidential and exempt from Florida's constitutional
public disclosure provisions.2 0 To facilitate anonymity, section 92.56
allows the state to substitute a false name for the true name in any
court records. 2 ' Once section 92.56 takes effect in a particular case,
the identity-revealing court records may not be made public without
incurring the courts' contempt powers.m
The confidential nature of the victim's identity extends to any in-
court testimony from the victim. To achieve this confidentiality, sec-
tion 92.56 provides that no publication or broadcast may include "an
identifying photograph, an identifiable voice, or the name or address
214. See FLA. STAT. § 92.56 (1995).
215. A simple outline of the Act's provisions may be found also in FIRST AMENDMENT FouN-
DATION, SECTION-BY-SEcnioN ANALYsIs oF SB 496 (June 15, 1995).
216. See id.
217. See FLA. STAT. § 92.56(l)(a)-(e) (1995).
218. See id. The specifics of the characteristics will be put aside temporarily to retain a focus
here on the broad functions of section 92.56 and the rest of the Act. See infra part VI.B.4.
(addressing the details of the characteristics).
219. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(1) (1995).
220. See id; see also infra note 249; FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(h) (1995).
221. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(3) (1995).
222. See id. § 92.56(2), (6) (1995).
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of the victim. ' ' 223 These restrictions are waivable if the victim person-
ally files with the court a written consent to cancel the Act's protective
anonymity. 224 However, the substance of the victim's testimony al-
ways remains susceptible to publicity. 225
As an assurance against any type of misinterpretation that could
violate the Sixth Amendment,226 section 92.56 plainly states that it
"'may not be construed to prevent the disclosure of the victim's iden-
tity to the defendant. 227 The defendant may apply to the trial court
for an "order of disclosure.'"'" This will provide the defendant (and
anyone else who is directly involved in the preparation of the defense)
with all identifying information concerning the victim.2 29 The defen-
dant and his defense team are equally vulnerable to contempt sanc-
tions for any "willful and knowing disclosure" of the identity to any
other person. 20
The Act offers protective anonymity to a far larger group of victims
than formerly effective section 794.03. Where former section 794.03
limited its scope to victims of sexual assault, 231 the new Act expands
the list of crimes for which victims can seek privacy. Specifically, vic-
tims of offenses described in Florida Statutes chapters 794 and 800
and some offenses described in chapter 827 may ask the trial court to
close the records. 232 Those chapters define and prohibit rape and simi-
lar sexual assaults, lewdness and indecent exposure, child abuse and
aggravated child abuse, as well as sexual performance by a child. 233
The Crime Victims Protection Act also creates two other new sta-
tutes. One of the statutes is section 794.024,234 which singles out public
employees and officers who might disclose a victim's identity. 235 When
public employees reveal a victim's confidential identity to parties
other than those directly involved with the prosecution, the public
223. Id. § 92.56(5) (1995).
224. Id. § 92.56(4) (1995).
225. Id.
226. To put the theory as simply and broadly as possible, the Sixth Amendment ensures that
criminal defendants may "confront" the witnesses who testify against them. See U.S. CoNST.
amend. VI.




231. See FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (Supp. 1994), held unconstitutional by Globe ll, 648 So. 2d
110 (Fla. 1994).
232. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(1) (1995).
233. See FLA. STAT. chs. 794, 800, 827 (1995).
234. FLA. STAT. § 794.024 (1995).
235. Id.
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employees are subject to second degree misdemeanor sanctions.236
This statute ostensibly satisfies judicial demands for government ac-
countability rather than media accountability alone.237
The third new statute is section 794.026, which provides an ex-
pressly civil cause of action for the victim personally; this cause of
action is invocable when any "entity or individual" communicates the
victim's confidential identity "prior to open judicial proceedings."2 38
The victim must show that the communication was intentional and in
"reckless disregard" for the highly offensive nature of that type of
revelation. 2 9 Then the communicator becomes liable to the victim for
all damages necessary to compensate the victim for any resultant inju-
ries. 2 0
Many of the provisions described above contain one or more flaws
that ought to render the new Crime Victims Protection Act unconsti-
tutional. Though there are many social and emotional merits to offer-
ing some privacy to victims of sexual assaults, the Florida Legislature
acted too quickly in the wake of the State v. Globe Communications
Corp. series of opinions. In the next sections, this Comment reveals
some weaknesses of the new Act.
B. Constitutional Infirmities of the New Act
1. Problems Regarding the Wide Scope of the Act
The very title of the Act reveals an inherent difference between the
new statutes and the formerly effective section 794.03. The Florida
Legislature is no longer limiting the privacy shield to rape victims but
now offers the shield to victims of any sort of sexual crime and some
non-sexual child abuse.24
The extension of the list of crimes for which victims may seek
court-imposed anonymity renders the Act hopelessly overbroad by
suppressing more speech than necessary-speech that the state does
not have a compelling interest to suppress.242 The state's interests in
protecting rape victims are based on policy arguments that are unique
236. See id.
237. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
238. See FLA. STAT. § 794.026 (1995).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
242. Overbroad statutes violate the First Amendment by punishing or affecting speech that
should otherwise be protected by the First Amendment. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 611-15 (1973).
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to rape. 243 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court decision in
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,20 which implied that a rape victim's name
could be suppressed if the state's interests in doing so were compel-
ling, was expressly limited to facts that dealt with rape. 245 The Florida
Legislature has not shown that the social stigma and ridicule that are
found in tandem with rape or the reluctance to report rape or assist
with its prosecution are at all problematic in situations involving
crimes other than rape. Though it would be hard to deny that similar
problems may exist with aggravated child abuse or sexual perform-
ance by a child, the Legislature has not produced any findings in this
regard. Lewdness and indecent exposure seem to be another matter
entirely. The Act possibly implies a non sequitur by assuming that vic-
tims of "flashing" are just as much in need of privacy as victims of
rape or sex-related child abuse. "Flashing" may be somewhat trau-
matic, but rape is unquestionably more so.
In summary, the state's interests are not equally significant for all
of the crimes covered by the Crime Victims Protection Act, and this
renders the Act overbroad. Admittedly, the Act's extended scope does
not render it facially unconstitutional;2 46 rather, the Act could become
unconstitutional as-applied if judges suppress the identities of victims
of crimes such as lewdness or similar crimes that are not so heinous as
rape. 247 By extending the list of crimes for which the press may be
prohibited from publicizing the victims' names, the Florida Legisla-
ture has provided powerful ammunition to those media supporters
who argue that such laws are a slippery slope leading to further cen-
sorship.24
2. Problems Regarding the Nature of the Confidentiality Offered
by the Act
When a victim's case proves to be one of those rare situations in
which privacy rights should outweigh press freedoms, the confidenti-
ality protection arising from the new Act is based on a closure of pub-
lic records. Upon the trial court's declaration, "[a]ll court records,
243. See discussion supra part II.A.
244. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
245. See id. at 541.
246. See 413 U.S. at 615 (explaining that a statute may be held invalid on its face only when
the overbreadth is "not only ... real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep").
247. Because the statutes within the Act depend on case-by-case decisions, the overbreadth
related to the Act's scope is curable through judicial interpretation and non-application in ap-
propriate circumstances. See id. at 615-16.
248. See supra part Il.B.
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including testimony from witnesses, that reveal the photograph,
name, or address of the victim. . . are confidential and exempt from
the provisions of s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution' 49 and may
not be made public." 2-° Any willful and knowing violation of that rule
will be considered contempt of court. 251
These clauses should be effective in solving two of the constitu-
tional infirmities of the Act's predecessor, but they simultaneously
raise other distinct and problematic concerns. The formerly effective
section 794.03 suffers from underinclusiveness and vagueness because
of the undefined phrase "instrument of mass communication. ' 252 The
new section 92.56 theoretically mends those weaknesses by facially
disregarding the nature of the speaker and focusing instead on the
speech-act itself: making information public. Thus, the statute avoids
the risk of defining "the press" in a way that violates the First
Amendment. However, although the Act was intended to include both
the "smalltime disseminator" as well as the "media giant," as recom-
mended by the United States Supreme Court, 253 the scope of section
92.56's phrase "may not be made public" is difficult to delimit pre-
cisely.
a. Problematic Statutory Language Regarding the Prohibited
Speech-Act and the Susceptible Speakers
The Act's ostensible focus on the speech-act itself is equally as
vague as is the formerly effective section 794.03's focus on the
speaker. What it means to make something public defies exact articu-
lation. Although no federal court has specifically ruled that the phrase
is unconstitutionally vague, 254 federal judges have been known to
249. This portion of the Florida Constitution states in part:
SECTION 24. Access to public records and meetings.- (a) Every person has the right
to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official
business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on
their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or spe-
cifically made confidential by this Constitution.
FLA. CONST. art. t, § 24(a).
250. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(1) (1995).
251. Id. 6.
252. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989); Globe 11, 648 So. 2d 110, 113
(Fla. 1994); Globe II, 622 So. 2d 1066, 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
253. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540. But see Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1125-27
(9th Cir. 1975) (explaining how privacy law distinguishes between individual speakers and mass
media speakers and stating that "[tlalking freely to someone is not in itself ... making public
the substance of the talk"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
254. Search on WESTLAW, Allfeds database, (January 22, 1996) (using the "terms and
connectors" search: "make public" "made public" /p vague vagueness; and using the "natural
language" search: "whether the statutory language 'make public' or 'made public' is unconstitu-
tionally vague").
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disagree about what type of activity the phrase encompasses.' Under
Florida law, the standard for testing vagueness is whether a person
"of ordinary intelligence should know what was intended. '256 The
problem inherent in the Legislature's use of the words "made public"
is that, although courts through the First Amendment may force the
law to ignore the difference between backyard gossips and media gi-
ants', the general populace does see that distinction in the word "pub-
lic." The common understanding of the word necessarily excludes de
minimus conversations.2 17 Ordinary citizens will not realize that, under
this new law, personal conversations are as sanctionable as nationwide
television broadcasts.
Furthermore, although the language seems facially unconcerned
with who the speaker is, it must implicitly account for the identity of
the speaker; otherwise the phrase loses all meaning. There can be no
speech-act without some type of speaker. Thus, the ambiguity of sec-
tion 92.56's language "may not be made public ' 258 is twofold. The
phrase is unclear about to whom it applies and what precisely it pro-
hibits.
The two issues are inextricable. For example, section 92.56 might
reasonably be interpreted to apply to court officers and similar gov-
ernment personnel who have access to previously public, newly confi-
dential, records. The first subsection of section 92.56 warns that
"court records .. .may not be made public, ' 25 9 a prohibition that
seems to imply-but does not expressly include-the additional phrase
"by those persons who have access to such records." Working under
the "government personnel" definition to which speakers are subject
under section 92.56, the prohibited speech-act should include at least
distributing copies of court records to members of the general public
255. See, e.g., McKnight v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 438 F. Supp 813, 824
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (complaining that the pleadings that averred that false accusations "were made
public" were "much too vague in [so] stating"). On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated on other
grounds but accepted the averment that false accusations had been "made public," on the basis
that one party had conceded that there had been "communication to others." 583 F.2d 1229,
1239 (3d Cir. 1978). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has distinguished communication to others
from public communication. See Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1125-27.
256. E.g., Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. 1994); State v. Bussey, 463 So. 2d 1141,
1144 (Fla. 1985) (stating that the vagueness question depends upon "whether the language of the
statute is sufficiently clear to provide a definite warning of what conduct will be deemed a viola-
tion; that is, whether ordinary people will understand what the statute requires or forbids, meas-
ured by common understanding and practice").
257. WEBSTER's NEW TWENTIETH CErTURY UNARID)GED DiCTIoNA.Y 1456 (2d ed. 1983) (de-
fining "public" as "known by, or open to the knowledge of, all or most people; as, he will make
this information public") (emphasis added).
258. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(1) (1995).
259. Id.
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or press, such as was done by the court clerk involved in the Cox
Broadcasting scenario.2 ° However, if section 92.56 applies to court
officers and government personnel and makes those persons subject to
contempt, 261 then section 92.56 renders superfluous the new section
794.024, which subjects public employees to criminal misdemeanor
sanctions for disclosing public records.m2 Conversely, the plain lan-
guage of section 794.024 raises doubts as to whether section 92.56 is
meant to apply to public employees at all. If section 92.56 does not
apply to public employees, then the section's language "may not be
made public" 263 might not include a speech-act such as showing court
records to a reporter.
Also, in certain circumstances, persons other than public employees
are capable of making court records public. For example, a reporter
may examine court records without permission during a courtroom
recess and then base a newspaper article on those records. Alterna-
tively, jurors who examine the records during deliberation are capable
of revealing the records' contents. A judge's family members or ac-
quaintances might accidentally see confidential records in chambers261
and would then have knowledge of the confidential records. All of
these examples indicate that the phrase "may not be made public"
could encompass many different types of speakers.
However having a broad scope does not necessarily prevent vague-
ness. For example, because of section 92.56's catchall language, the
law is unclear on whether "repeaters" fall within its purview. An ex-
ample of a repeater is a newspaper that publishes information after
that information has already been released, such as by an earlier state-
wide or nationwide television broadcast. The Globe was a repeater be-
cause several foreign newspapers had published Patricia Bowman's
name before The Globe.26 In defamation law, "repeaters" generally
are not immune from liability;2" by analogy, "repeaters" might be
susceptible to section 92.56.
Because of two crucial distinctions, however, the rules of defama-
tion law on the issue of repeaters may not be appropriate in situations
involving victim privacy. First, defamation law focuses primarily on
the reputation interests of the defamed plaintiff and leaves the state's
260. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 472-73 n.3 (1975).
261. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(6) (1995).
262. Id. § 794.024 (1995).
263. Id. § 92.56(1) (1995).
264. The question of whether a judge can be in contempt of his or her own order is trouble-
some in its own right.
265. See supra note 130.
266. SeeKEEToN, supranote 168, § 113.
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interests to play only a supporting role. 267 Second, defamation law is
based on the principle that false and defamatory material is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment; 268 this principle explains, to a certain
extent, the de-emphasis on the state's interests. In contrast, a crime
victim's identity is true information, which receives full First Amend-
ment protection except when the state's interests in suppressing that
information are compelling.2 69 Thus, the legal theory of victim privacy
may be said to rely primarily on the interests of the state270 and to
leave the privacy interest of the victim as a secondary factor-one
which may heighten the state's interests depending upon the circum-
stances. 271 For these reasons, no court should sanction a repeater for
identifying a victim because, once the victim's identity has been made
public for the first time, the state no longer has a compelling interest
in suppressing the information. 272 If a repeater is punished under sec-
tion 92.56, the statute will be functioning in an unconstitutionally
overbroad fashion.273 That potential for overbreadth is present in
other portions of the new Act as well; the aggregate makes the entire
Act substantially overbroad. 27 4
Just as section 92.56's vagueness may lead to overbreadth, as ex-
plained above, its ambiguity also seriously infringes on the concept of
"fair warning" through due process. A basic proposition of the law is
that the people who are subject to it must be forewarned of that
fact. 275 Certainly newspapers, television stations, and other media
267. See generally id. § 115.
268. This concept is illustrated in Garrison v. Louisiana, in which the Court states:
Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which 'are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. . . .' Hence the knowingly false statement and the false statement
made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (citations omitted).
269. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
270. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989) (inquiring whether former section
794.03 serves a need to further state interests of the highest order).
271. Cf. infra part VI.B.4.
272. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 539 (implying that the state's interests are undercut when
"the identity of the victim is already known throughout the community").
273. Publishing true information is protected by the First Amendment unless the state has
interests that are compelling in the specific instance at hand. Therefore, even if repeaters are
clearly within the statute's meaning, the statute is overbroad for punishing them. See Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972) (stating that "[al clear and precise enactment may
nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct").
274. See discussion infra part VI.B.3-4.
275. E.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988) ("Objections to vagueness under
the Due Process Clause rest on the lack of notice, and hence may be overcome in any specific
case where reasonable persons would know that their conduct is at risk."). The Court in
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giants are forewarned that they are subject to the restrictions of sec-
tion 92.56. However, the phrase "made public" still does not properly
or clearly define which entities are the small-time disseminators that
may have been swept within the new Act's scope.
From a policy perspective regarding small-time disseminators, legis-
lative reliance on a catchall phrase, such as "may not be made pub-
lic," is unwise. The earlier example of the nosy reporter serves as a
good model for this analysis. The reporter crosses the bar during re-
cess and inappropriately reads the papers that sit on the temporarily
vacant clerk's bench. In that set of circumstances, the clerk did not
willfully and knowingly give information to the reporter and is not
therefore guilty of contempt. 276 Yet, somebody who was once ignorant
of the alleged victim's identity-the reporter-now has knowledge
that was previously confidential. Whether or not this means that the
information has been made public is unclear. If the reporter does not
tell anyone or use the information in a broadcast, then an assumption
that the information has not been made public is reasonable. The as-
sumption may no longer be reasonable, however, if the reporter
shares the information during his family dinner conversation, perhaps
becoming a small-time disseminator.
Granted, the reviewing courts sought a statute that would deter
"the backyard gossip" as well as the "media giant." ' 77 However, the
challenge for legislators is to strive toward plainer distinctions regard-
ing what speech-activity or which speakers are included, rather than to
draft catchall language such as that in section 92.56. Even if a judge
could decisively rule that a situation such as the reporter's dinner con-
versations falls squarely within the meaning of the statute, that type
of situation is one in which the state probably should not become in-
volved. Even though the First Amendment may preclude distinguish-
ing between media giants and media midgets, this preclusion should
not discourage legislators from distinguishing between media midgets
and everyday living room conversationalists. Otherwise, the state
could invoke a statute designed to protect privacy for the ironic pur-
pose of invading what is normally and traditionally considered to be a
very private sphere.278
Maynard went on to explain that "specific case" or "as-applied" analysis for problems of due
process vagueness is appropriate only for "statutes not threatening First Amendment interests."
Id. For statutes that do, vagueness could be grounds to strike.
276. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(6) (1995).
277. E.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989).
278. For support of the proposition that the state may not punish speech within the privacy
of one's home, even when the speech is recognized to be unprotected by the First Amendment,
see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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The statutory language in section 92.56 about making information
public is ambiguous as to who and what might be classified as sanc-
tionable. This is a serious problem that ought to render section 92.56
void for vagueness, 279 overbroadness, and a violation of due process.
b. Problematic Statutory Language Regarding What Will Become
Confidential
Additional vagueness concerns are raised by the clause within sec-
tion 92.56 that defines which judicial materials will become confiden-
tial. By stating that "all court records" that reveal the photograph,
name, or address of a sexual crime victim "may not be made pub-
lic,' 280 the statute is susceptible to several potentially conflicting
meanings. The statute might mean only that the image of the victim or
the few words identifying the victim's name or address may not be
made public. The name or photograph could be blacked out before
distributing copies of court records to the public or press. Also, this
meaning would at least ensure that only the narrowest, most unex-
pandable range of facts would be excluded from being published.
Thus, the slippery slope becomes less slippery.
On the other hand, section 92.56 might reasonably be interpreted to
mean that the entirety of any record becomes confidential if some
subsection within that record mentions the victim's real name. This
interpretation should be deemed unconstitutional because far too
much non-private information about the judicial proceedings would
then be shrouded from the press. The press has "[g]reat responsibility
... to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government.'s l
When the press engages in this special responsibility as the "Fourth
Estate, ' 2 2 it is performing "precisely the function it was intended to
perform by those who wrote the First Amendment." 2s3 Accordingly,
accurate reports of judicial proceedings receive extra protection. 2S
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has pointedly
avoided an express or implied ruling upon "any constitutional
279. Cf. Globe II, 622 So. 2d 1066, 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (noting that section 794.03's
phrase "instrument of mass communication [is] so ambiguous that it may also render the statute
void-for-vagueness"), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994); see generally Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (explaining the legal principle of void-for-vagueness).
280. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(1) (1995).
281. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
282. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 HASTmNS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (adopting a meta-
phor coined by Thomas Carlyle).
283. Id. at 631; see also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FoUND. Ras. J. 521, 528.
284. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 492-93.
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questions which might arise from a state policy not allowing access by
the public and press to various kinds of official records.' '8 But the
Court's philosophy on that issue indicates that the state must distin-
guish between what information is truly private and what is not.U6
Despite strong feelings about the private nature of a rape victim's spe-
cific identity, it can be conceded that the surrounding judicial pro-
ceedings are of a public, publishable nature because those proceedings
involve government prosecution of a violent, antisocial crime.W7
Withholding reams of trial transcript or motions on the basis that a
few of the pages include a person's name would thwart a core func-
tion of the media in violation of the First Amendment's Press Clause.
Furthermore, withholding extra information about the prosecution
would not serve the state's asserted interests. This is because the vic-
tim's safety, reputation, and self-confidence are less threatened by
those portions of judicial proceedings that do not reveal the victim's
identity.28 Even if the trial court grants anonymity to a victim, little
or no good is accomplished for the victim or the state by closing the
courthouse doors on nonvictim testimony, evidentiary hearings, or
jury instructions.
There is another manner in which the phrase "all court records"2 9
can be interpreted too broadly, placing the Act in substantial jeopardy
of being held void for vagueness.2 It involves the distinction between
recognizing information as court records and recognizing information
qua information and is best exemplified by a comparison of similar
hypotheticals. If the nosy reporter, referred to earlier, reads the court
records on the clerk's desk and then writes a newspaper article based
on them, then his information seems to be within the meaning of
court records. However, if the reporter is the only nonjudicial ob-
server in the courtroom during a hearing and the reporter learns the
victim's name because a witness accidentally mentions it on the stand,
285. Id. at 496 n.26.
286. See id. In Cox Broadcasting the Court advised:
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must
respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private
information. Their political institutions must weigh the interests in privacy with the
interests of the public to know and of the press to publish.
Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
287. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536-37 (1989) (stating that the commis-
sion and investigation of violent crimes is a matter of "paramount public import").
288. The express legislative purpose section of the Crime Victims Protection Act hinges the
integrity of the victim's safety, reputation, and self-confidence only on the risk of "public dis-
closure of the victim's identity." Problems are not attributed to participating in judicial proceed-
ings, or to the proceedings themselves. See 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-207, § 2, 1832, 1832-33.
289. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(1) (1995).
290. See supra note 279.
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the information may no longer be fairly within the meaning of court
records-this, despite the fact that the witness's testimony is part of
the record. The comparison illustrates the possibility of varying, or
even conflicting, judicial interpretations of what information comes
from court records and what information does not.
On-the-spot determinations of whether to enjoin reporters under
section 92.56 are unconstitutional under an interpretation of the hold-
ing in Oklahoma Publishing Company v. District Court:29' a state
court is not permitted to prohibit the publication of information ob-
tained during open judicial proceedings. 292 The inexplicit nature of the
phrase "all court records" may lead to violations of this rule of law.
Moreover, other portions of section 92.56 also violate the Oklahoma
Publishing rule, specifically, the clauses regarding reproduction of vic-
tim testimony.
c. Problematic Statutory Language Limiting the Reproduction of
Testimony
The effects of limiting the reproduction of witness testimony illus-
trate another weakness in the Crime Victims Protection Act. Under
section 92.56, no publication or broadcast may include "an identify-
ing photograph, an identifiable voice, or the name or address of the
victim." 293 The "substance" of the victim's testimony remains suscep-
tible to publicity, however. 294 The constitutional question raised by
these provisions is based on the general difference between closing
public access only to judicial records, as opposed to closing public
access to live judicial proceedings.
The plain language of the Act refers to making "all court records"
confidential; no provision exists for keeping the public or press out of
the courtroom at any time. 295 Of course, there is no constitutional
problem with not keeping the press out of the courtroom; in fact, the
press belongs there for the sake of the public. 296 Both the press and the
291. 430U.S. 308 (1977).
292. Id. at 310.
293. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(5) (1995).
294. See id.
295. See id., § 92.56.
296. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (stating that "in a soci-
ety in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first
hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in
convenient form the facts of those operations"); Gerald Dworkin, Privacy and the Law, in PRI-
VACY 113, 124 (John B. Young ed., 1978) ("It is a basic principle of the legal system that justice
must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done."). "Prima facie, judicial pro-
ceedings are in public and the interest in open justice overrides the individual interest in pri-
vacy." Id.; see Stewart, supra note 282, at 634.
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general public have a constitutionally protected, although conditional,
right of access to criminal trials.29' There are some exceptions to the
general rule, however, for which the courtroom doors may be
closed .291
Although section 92.56 does not expressly close the courtroom
doors, it nevertheless attempts to prohibit making public "an identify-
ing photograph" or "an identifiable voice" of a rape victim when
that victim takes the stand to testify publicly. 299 This prohibition is
arguably unconstitutional for two reasons. The first is somewhat intu-
itive. A plain language interpretation of the phrase "identifying pho-
tograph," employing the principle inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius'°0 would theoretically allow the publication of highly accurate
portraits drawn by courtroom sketch artists or intricately detailed
written explanations of the physical appearance of the victim. This
underinclusiveness leaves a loophole that seriously undermines the
state's attempts at meeting its interests.
The second reason involves the manner in which the statute restricts
the press's ability to make editorial decisions about portraying a pub-
lic event. By implication, section 92.56 allows the press to attend the
proceedings and view the victim during live, public testimony.30' Simi-
larly, section 92.56 does not prohibit the press from bringing cameras
or tape recorders into the courtroom, nor does the section authorize
judges to order the press to remove such equipment.3 2 Nevertheless,
the statute prohibits media representatives from broadcasting what
they film or record in the open courtroom.
The United States Supreme Court has condoned some restrictions
on the press that involved prohibiting all use of cameras or recording
devices in certain situations. For example, the plurality in Houchins v.
KQED, Inc30 3 refused to condemn a sheriff's policy of allowing the
media to tour a jail under the condition that no camera equipment be
used.? 4 Section 92.56 is distinct, though, because it places no
297. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558-81 (1980) (plurality opinion).
298. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 296, at 124.
299. See FLA. STAT. § 92.56(5) (1995).
300. Literally, the "inclusion of one is the exclusion of another." BLAcK's LAw DiCTIONARY
763 (6th ed. 1990).
301. See FLA. STAT. § 92.56(5) (1995) (containing no language about closing court or exclud-
ing the media).
302. See id. (containing no language about cameras or recording devices).
303. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
304. See id. at 9 (recognizing "no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public
or the media to enter these institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving and still pic-
tures of inmates for broadcast purposes" (emphasis added)).
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restrictions on whether the media may bring recording equipment into
the courtroom. Strong arguments have been made in support of the
principle that once the press is allowed to film or record an event, the
press should be allowed to publish or broadcast the material. 35 In the
words of Justice Stewart, "[I]f a television reporter is to convey the
sights and sounds to those who cannot personally visit the place, he
must use cameras and sound equipment. ' ' 306 This philosophy played
out in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,1°7 where reporters
photographed an alleged juvenile delinquent as the juvenile was es-
corted from the courthouse to a vehicle.)° Because the juvenile's im-
age had been "publicly revealed," the United States Supreme Court
refused to uphold an injunction against publication of the image. 309
At least one Florida appellate court expressly ruled that the media
may not be prevented from disseminating films or recordings of pub-
lic proceedings if the media had been allowed to utilize its recording
equipment during the proceeding. 1° The court identified such a prohi-
bition as a prior restraint. 311
Another Florida appellate court implied the same rule by identify-
ing a narrow exception to it. In Mayer v. State,"' a judge had re-
quired, as a condition of a reporter's attendance at a juvenile court
proceeding that could have been closed under statutory authorization,
that the reporter expressly agree not to disseminate any of the infor-
mation she gathered there. When the reporter broke her promise to
the judge and published the details of the proceeding, the judge im-
posed contempt sanctions that were subsequently upheld.3"3
The new Act does not prohibit ordinary, nonmedia citizens from
entering the courtroom to witness a rape trial, nor does it prevent the
media from doing so. If the Legislature has not drafted the statute in
such a manner as to prevent a citizen from going to court to see or
listen to a witness's testimony, then the same statute should not be
permitted to prevent a different citizen at home from watching
television to see or listen to the same witness. As a general rule, "one
305. See id. at 17-18 (Stewart, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 17.
307. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
308. Id. at 309.
309. See id. at 310.
310. Times Publishing Co. v. State, 632 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (holding that
"[i]f the media are allowed to take cameras into the courtroom, they are allowed to disseminate
what they film").
311. Id.
312. 523 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
313. See id. at 1176.
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who testifies at a trial testifies before the public. ' 31 4 With the passage
of the Crime Victims Protection Act, which expressly forces the media
to censor itself by altering a film's image or soundtrack, the timing is
ripe for revisiting the question of whether the state may force such
editing techniques. The answer is likely to be "no," because the
United States Supreme Court strongly disfavors legislation that allows
the government to perform key editorial decision-making for the
American media. 1 5
3. Problems Regarding Who May Argue for Anonymity Under
the Act
Under the express terms of section 92.56, either the victim or the
state may ask the trial court to close the records of the case and grant
protective anonymity. 1 6 This option inherently diminishes the signifi-
cance of the state's interests in toto. Under a statutory framework
that depends on ad hoc decisionmaking, the judge's conclusion as to
whether the state's interests are fully compelling in any specific case
can be soundly based only on an assertion of such interests by the
state itself. Certainly, the state's interests may be recognized and
weighed by the courts for the sake of broad legal conclusions. How-
ever, individualized adjudication is crucial to the success of the Crime
Victims Protection Act.3 1 7 This means that the state's interests must
prove compelling in each and every case in which a victim receives
protective anonymity.
The victim alone should not be allowed to argue for anonymity in a
case where the state itself is unwilling to come forward to assert that
its interests in protecting that specific victim are of the highest order.
As a matter of course, nearly all victims of sexual crimes probably will
desire confidentiality and feel convinced that their own interests are
compelling. Nevertheless, the proper legal standard is clinical and is
not based on whether the particular victim has compelling interests in
privacy. The intensity of the state's interests is the true measurement
that must be made under the Constitution."" In order for that meas-
urement to be made, the victim should have the state in court as well.
314. United States v. Salerno, 828 F.2d 958, 960 (2d Cir. 1987).
315. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornilo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring) ("[W]e ... remain intensely skeptical about those measures that would allow gov-
ernment to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's press.").
316. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(5) (1995).
317. Globe I, 622 So. 2d 1066, 1079 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), aff'd, 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
318. See supra discussion in part In.
19951
558 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:513
4. Problems Regarding Individualized Adjudication Under the
Act
The provision for individualized adjudication within section 92.56 is
in deference to the unanimous advice of the appellate courts that ruled
on section 794.03.19 Unlike the effects of the formerly effective sec-
tion 794.03, section 92.56 does not allow victims to receive protective
anonymity unless a judge rules that the specific case involves the
state's interests to a compelling degree. Specifically, under the Act
there must be a showing that five independent characteristics exist. 320
The first three are modeled after the examples listed by the United
States Supreme Court as possible factors that would undercut the pri-
vacy rights of the victim.3 2 1 These characteristics were drafted into the
new statute in converse order to the Court's list. First is that the
"identity of the victim is not already known in the community" ;322
second is that the "victim has not voluntarily called public attention
to the offense"; and third is that the "identity of the victim has not
otherwise become a reasonable subject of public concern.' '323
The fourth characteristic that must be shown under the new Act
before a victim's identity can be kept confidential is that disclosure
"would be offensive to a reasonable person." '3 2 This characteristic
can also be traced to the Florida Star v. B.J.F. opinion3 2 and brings
the Act more in accord with traditional privacy law standards.32
Adoption of the time-honored "reasonable person" standard lends le-
gitimacy to the new statutory provisions.
The fifth and final characteristic forces the court to consider
whether disclosure of the victim's identity would endanger the victim,
prevent the victim from testifying, or cause the victim mental harm.3 27
Also included is a catchall option allowing the judge to recognize
any other good cause why the victim may deserve or need
319. See, e.g, Globe I1, 622 So. 2d at 1079.
320. See FLA. STAT. § 92.56(1) (1995) (listing the five characteristics).
321. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989).
322. Though this factor might appear to address the ambiguity of whether "repeaters" will
be subject to the statute, the question is not answered so easily. For example, in the Globe
Communications scenario, The Globe was a repeater because other newspapers had previously
revealed Patricia Bowman's identity. Yet, because these newspapers were located in Europe, a
judge might find under section 92.56 that the identity of the victim was not already known in the
local community and could be shielded.
323. FLA. STAT. § 92.56(1)(a)-(c) (1995) (emphasis added).
324. Id. § 92.56(1)(d) (1995).
325. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989).
326. See WUILIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 97 (2d ed. 1955).
327. See FLA. STAT. § 92.56(1)(e) (1995).
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anonymity.3 2 However, no catchall option exists on the other side of
the equation. The court is not given any authority to recognize that in
a certain case, even if all five characteristics are present, there may be
other unpredicted reasons that undercut the intensity of the state's in-
terests in the victim's privacy. For example, the court may believe that
a particular victim has less need for privacy because the victim is a
celebrity or public figure. Or, perhaps the accused is a celebrity or
public figure, such as William Kennedy Smith, and the court believes
that this fact reduces the state's interests in protecting the victim. If
the accused is a popular and powerful politician, the court may feel
that the public's right to know the identity of the accuser outweighs
the existence of the other five characteristics. As another example, the
state's interests in protecting a particular victim are lessened if the vic-
tim is no longer living. Also, consider a rape that has only local signif-
icance because the victim is a foreigner who is about to return to his
or her home overseas. Finally, some victims may show a fear or un-
willingness to assist in a prosecution regardless of an opportunity to
remain anonymous. The state's interests in all of these examples are
probably not compelling.
Courts must have the flexibility to account for unpredictable situa-
tions in which the state's interests in the victim's privacy should not
outweigh the First Amendment. In truth, much flexibility is available
from the broad nature of the third characteristic, which requires that
the identity of the victim "has not otherwise become a reasonable sub-
ject of public concern. ' 2 9 That provision, though, relies on the nature
of the victim qua victim. 3 0 The provision would be less able to ac-
count for some of the possibilities listed in the preceding paragraph,
including the situations involving the foreign victim and the deceased
victim. Without more express flexibility to give weight to such circum-
stances, section 92.56 should be held unconstitutionally overbroad.
VII. CONCLUSION: FLORIDA MUST PERSIST IN ATTEMPTING To SOLVE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
This Comment's analysis may only scratch the surface of the Crime
Victims Protection Act and reach the most blatant constitutional
problems with the legislation. Additional scrutiny will likely find other
troublesome aspects of the Act or expand upon the material herein. A
328. Id.
329. Id. § 92.56(l)(c) (1995).
330. For example, as the United States Supreme Court speculated in dicta, the victim's iden-
tity may become a reasonable subject of public concern because "the victim fabricated an assault
by a particular person." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989).
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possible reason the Act is so problematic is that the Florida Legisla-
ture gave great credence to judicial reasoning which was intimately
related to section 794.03. Instead of following the advice in the Flor-
ida Star and Globe Communications opinions and simply amending
section 794.03, the Legislature used judicial dicta to guide the con-
struction of an entirely new statutory scheme. Now, these new statutes
are themselves in need of amendment.
Victims of rape and similar sexual crimes may need privacy for so-
cial and emotional reasons. The State of Florida may need to give
them that privacy in order to meet its own sociological or legal needs.
However, under the United States Constitution, a state may not give
victims privacy without an extremely careful analysis and assurances
that the First Amendment will not be ignored. The Crime Victims
Protection Act does not display such careful analysis or assurances.
Much of the language in the new statutes must be clarified. Those
people or entities subject to the Act must be forewarned of that fact,
and they must know more specifically what behavior is prohibited.
Courts must be afforded more flexibility in determining whether any
given case passes constitutional muster. Also, section 92.56 should be
revised to eliminate forced censorship. If the Florida Legislature made
each of those changes thoughtfully and effectively, the Crime Victims
Protection Act would then be much closer to meeting constitutional
standards, and victims could take comfort in a more dependable form
of anonymity. The State of Florida should continue in its efforts to
solve this constitutional dilemma and balance the tension between pri-
vacy rights and press freedoms.
